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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
A great deal of attention has been paid to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in both 
developed countries and emerging countries. CSR usually refers to voluntary behaviour by a firm that 
integrates social issues, such as environmental problems, into the firm’s business operations without 
blindly sacrificing profits. According to the KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2013 
(KPMG International, 2013), as of 2013, more than 80 per cent of firms in many developed countries, 
such as France, Denmark, the UK, the US, and Japan, and developing countries, like Malaysia and 
Indonesia, reported their CSR activities. There are incentives for social responsible behaviour not only by 
private corporations but also by governments, the United Nations, and other international organisations. 
Governments, particularly in European countries, have passed regulations concerning environmental 
investments. For example, the governments of Germany and the Netherlands have offered tax advantages 
for companies willing to invest in renewable energy. The governments of the UK, Austlia, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden have passed regulations requiring companies to disclose the extent to which 
social, environmental, and ethical concerns were considered during the investment process (Eurosif, 
2014). The United Nations, on the other hand, proposed the UN Global Compact’s Ten Principles in 1999 
that asks companies and organisations to be responsible leaders for creating a sustainable society, which 
enlisted over 12,000 participants of corporations and stakeholders from more than 145 countries.1 In 
1976, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) published the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which encourages multinational firms to conduct their business 
in a responsible way.2 There are also CSR guidelines for firms, such as the ISO 26000,3 and GRI 
guidelines,4 which are expected to be a universal guide to implement CSR activities. 
Looking at domestic trends of CSR, Japanese firms have been actively working on CSR, 
although the concept was imported from Europe in the late 1990s. On the back of developing awareness 
of a concept on CSR, more than 80 per cent of companies listed on the Tokyo Exchange have engaged in 
CSR as of November 2010 (Keizai Douyukai, 2010). Another reflection of the attention paid by Japanese 
firms is the fact that they rank second in the world in acquiring ISO 14001 certifications (ISO, 2010). The 
launch of domestic CSR ranking systems has been increasing, including the Nikkei Corporate 
                                            
1 For more details, see https://www.unglobalcompact.org/index.html. 
2 Find our more in http://mneguidelines.oecd.org. 
3 See http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm for more details. 
4 For more information, refer to https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx. 
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Environmental Management Ranking,5 and the Toyo Keizai Japan CSR Ranking,6 which fill the pages of 
newspapers once they are published every year. In terms of government involvements in CSR, Japan 
introduced the Law Concerning the Promotion of Business Activities with Environmental Consideration 
by Specified Corporations, etc., by Facilitating Access to Environmental Information, and Other 
Measures.7 The law forces specific entities to create and publish an environmental report every year and 
encourages firms to integrate environmental considerations into their business activities and publish 
reports of their own. 
 As more attention has been paid to CSR, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has also 
received increased attentions. SRI is an investment process using positive or negative screening that takes 
into accounts for financial performance and the value of CSR. SRI has grown rapidly around the world 
over recent decades, especially in Europe and the US. The Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2015) 
reported that the proportion of SRI relative to the total management assets in Europe and the US is 58.8 
per cent and 17.9 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, the SRI market in Japan can be regarded as 
one in a developing stage since it accounts for less than 1 per cent (Japan Sustainable Investment Forum, 
2013).  
As a reflection of the popularity of SRI in western countries, there exists a considerable 
amount of academic literature about SRI in economic contexts, starting with the question about whether 
CSR activities are evaluated in financial markets. In other words, people wondered whether or not SRI 
outperformed or underperformed the conventional investments that were not socially screened. Based on 
the idea that CSR strategies could enhance the competitiveness and the social credibility of a firm or 
would reduce the management risks in the long run, SRI could outperform conventional investments. For 
example, Heal (2005) argued that establishing brand equity critically affects purchasing decisions for 
customers where there is little space for corporations to differentiate their products from others. Heal 
(2005) also cited other examples of advantages of participating in CSR such as improving relationship 
with regulators, improving the productivity, and lowering the cost of capital. On the other hand, some 
people would argue that SRI underperforms the non-ethical investment since asking for social goals does 
cost to companies, which leads to press management in the short term. Further, investment screening 
limits the universe of selectable funds, which theoretically decreases the expected performance and incur 
diversification costs (Guenster, 2012).  
                                            
5 See Environmental Management Survey Report (in Japanese) published by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei  
  Research (Eds.) 
6 For more details, see http://www.toyokeizai.net/csr/english/.  
7 Refer to the website of Ministry of Environment, Government of Japan as below:    
  https://www.env.go.jp/en/laws/policy/business.pdf 
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Based on the survey, the general finding from the existing studies is that the difference 
between SRI and conventional investment is not statistically significant, as shown in Table 1.1. Let’s look 
at previous studies for more details.  
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Literature Review 
 
* It changed their name to “FTSE KLD 400 Social Index” in July 2009. 
Result: For event studies, + indicates CSR-related news affected the stock price positively, while – indicates a 
negative impact on the share price. “Mixed” means both positive and negative results were obtained. For non-event 
studies, ＋ means the SRI or stock of a socially responsible firm outperformed the counterpart, while – shows the 
SRI or stock of a socially responsible firm underperformed the counterpart. “Mixed” means both positive and 
negative results were obtained. 
Significance: ◯ means the estimation obtained the statistically significance, × means it did not. “Mixed” means 
both significant and insignificant results were obtained. 
 
The studies with a check mark in the “Event Study” column of in Table 1.1 examine the 
impact of CSR-related events or news on share prices with an event study methodology. Hamilton 
(1995) used the day that the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data was released as the event to analyse 
the impact of TRI release. TRI is the database published by the Environmental Protection Agency 
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(EPA) in the United States to provide the public with an annual list of chemicals used by firms. 
Manufacturing companies with more than ten employees and who use or manufacture greater amounts 
of chemicals than the standard have to report information about their chemical use to the EPA. Result 
showed that on the event day (19th June 1989), the information negatively affected the firms’ stock price 
and was statistically significant. They also estimated the impact using a subsample of firms with media 
coverage. Likewise, the average abnormal return over the subsample was negative and statistically 
significant. Additionally, they calculated the dollar loss from the release, estimated to be an average loss 
of $4.1 million in the stock value. Results also showed that firms who used more chemicals suffered 
from a greater decrease in share price. Flammer (2012) also examined the impact of environmentally 
unfriendly news on stocks prices. He found that firms’ socially irresponsible behaviour is assessed 
negatively in the financial market, which can be interpreted to mean that investors might avoid 
investing in such firms, or might be more likely to invest in socially or environmentally responsible 
firms because they are less risky investments.  
Some research studies have investigated Japanese cases. Takeda and Tomozawa (2006) 
examined how the release of the Environmental Management Ranking affected the stock price in Japan 
from 1998 to 2005. They used the environmental ranking issued by the best-known economic 
newspaper in Japan, Nikkei, to investigate how manufacturing companies dealt with the environmental 
protection and improvement in business efficiency at the same time and reported data on the top 30 
firms. In their study, the standard event study methodology was conducted on all samples, by industry, 
by year, and by ranking. For all manufacturing firms, the release of the Nikkei Environmental 
Management Ranking positively impacted stock prices, but the results were not statistically significant. 
With industry-classified estimation, they classified eight industries: Electronics, Automobiles, 
Electricity & Gas, Office Supplier & Publishers, Food, Machinery, Chemicals, and Others. The result 
revealed that only “Office Suppliers & Publishers”, “Food”, and “Others” showed a significant positive 
impact on share price. Although the results did not have any tendency from 1998 to 2002, placing in the 
Nikkei ranking has positively affected share prices since 2003. However, focusing on estimated result 
by rank provides a totally different story. Companies that had been upgraded in the Nikkei ranking 
decreased their share price significantly, whereas those who had been downgraded increased stock 
prices. Yamaguchi (2008) reexamined the stock price response to companies’ environmental 
performance with the exactly same data as Takeda and Tomozawa (2006) but with the different 
methodology, using the EGARCH model that accounts for the heteroskedasticity, which can often be 
observed in stock price. It showed that the average cumulative returns reacted significantly positive in 
three out of eight years with OLS estimation, while the announcement significantly affected stock 
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prices with EGARCH models in four out of eight years, which may show that the results were greatly 
different when considering heteroskedasticity. Hence, Yamaguchi (2008) concluded that the Nikkei 
Environmental ranking did affect stock prices in contrast to the result by Takeda and Tomozawa (2006). 
The non-event studies in Table 1.1 compared the performance of SRI funds and conventional 
funds over the long term. Hamilton et al. (1993) performed one of the earliest studies comparing the 
performances of SRI funds and conventional funds. They used the monthly return data of equity mutual 
funds in the United States from 1981 through 1990, and Jensen’s alpha to measure the performance. 
Based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (hereafter CAPM), Jensen’s alpha measures the performance of 
the stock relative to the market portfolio (Jensen, 1968). The mean monthly excess return of SRI funds 
established in 1985 or earlier was greater than that of conventional funds, though the difference between 
them was not statistically significant. As for the funds established after 1985, the mean excess return of 
SRI funds was lower than that of conventional funds but not at a statistically significant level. The results 
indicated that the market did not value the non-financial benefits of SRI funds. Goldreyer et al. (1999) 
extended this study by dividing the sample into subsamples by investment strategies, portfolio size, and 
risk, to compare SRI funds and conventional funds from 1981 through 1997, although the period of fund 
varies. Consistent with the previous study, most comparisons did not show any significant differences. 
However, SRI funds employing an inclusion screen significantly outperformed SRI funds without an 
inclusion screen. Statman (2000) compared the performance of an SRI Index (the Domini Social Index) 
and a conventional index (the S&P 500), and conducted a comparison of performance between SRI funds 
and conventional funds in the United States between 1990 and 1998 period. In line with previous studies, 
the performance difference between SRI and conventional funds was not statistically significant. He also 
found that the Domini Social Index outperformed S&P 500, but the difference between them was not 
significant. Gil-Bazo et al. (2010) also compared the performance of US SRI funds and conventional 
funds from 1997 to 2005. They found that SRI funds run by management companies specialising in SRI 
performed better than conventional funds run by generalist management companies or all management 
companies. However, SRI funds run by other than specialised management companies underperform the 
conventional funds, demonstrating the importance of specialised SRI management skills. Climent and 
Soriano (2011) conducted a similar analysis, but they found that green funds caught up with conventional 
funds on a more recent period (2001-2009), while they underperformed their counterparts through the 
entire research period of 1987-2009. 
Studies with data from other countries also obtained similar results. For example, Bauer et al. 
(2005) investigated the performance of SRI funds and conventional funds in Germany, the UK, and the 
US for the period 1990 to 2001 period. Unlike earlier studies, this research included dead funds in the 
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sample. If dead funds were disregarded in the estimation, the results would be overestimated: this is 
called survivorship bias (Brown et al., 1992). They therefore added dead funds to the sample to mitigate 
the survivorship bias. They used the CAPM model and found that, in all regions, there was no statistically 
significant difference in performance between SRI funds and conventional funds, even though most SRI 
funds outperformed conventional funds in value. In terms of differences in exposure to market risk, SRI 
funds were significantly less sensitive than conventional funds except in the case of the US international 
mutual funds. They used the multi-factor model introduced by Carhart (1997) that was developed from 
the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993). Although SRI funds outperformed conventional funds in 
all areas (except Germany) in value, there was again no statistically significant difference in returns 
between SRI and conventional funds, even after controlling for four factors. Moreover, they analysed 
how people in three countries have been pricing CSR over time by subtracting Jensen’s alpha of 
conventional funds from that of SRI funds in these four-year periods: 1990-1993, 1994-1997, and 
1998-2001. Except in the UK domestic market, SRI funds significantly underperformed conventional 
funds in the earliest period, but SRI funds outperformed conventional funds in all areas in the third period. 
Given these outcomes, it seems that SRI funds have been catching up to conventional funds, probably as 
a result of greater investor confidence. However, the performance of SRI funds does not differ from those 
of conventional funds in a statistically significant way, based on data from the UK (Gregory et al., 1997); 
the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany (Kreander et al., 2005); Australia (Bauer et al., 2006); 
Canada (Bauer et al., 2007); European countries (Ziegler et al., 2007), 17 countries around the world 
(Renneboog et al., 2008); European countries (Ziegler, 2009); as well as Japan, the US and the European 
countries (Itoh et al., 2013).  
 Summing up what we know so far, SRI already has a strong presence in the financial markets 
of Europe, and the United States, even though most of the earlier studies concluded that there is not a 
statistically significant difference between SRI and conventional investments. From the results of 
empirical studies, people in Europe and the US do not consider CSR activities merely as a cost. Moreover, 
the result of Curran and Moran (2007) suggested that people might consider CSR as an essential company 
activity because the financial market in the UK negatively judged firms removed from the SRI index, 
which is contrary to Friedman’s famous argument about CSR: “The social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits.”  
A number of possible reasons might explain why the SRI market in Japan is still fairly small. 
First, investors and potential investors have no idea how the CSR activities have been evaluated in the 
Japanese financial market. Due to this lack of analysis, investors may be disinclined to invest in SRIs than 
conventional investments back by abundant information and academic research. Second, the demographic 
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and psychological characteristic of potential Japanese SRI investors has not been identified, which is 
basic information for the marketing. Therefore, investment firms are not able to conduct an effective 
promotion about these investments. Third, we do not fully understand what motivates people to pursue 
investments in SRI. For instance, a tremendous number of studies explore situations in which people 
invest in public goods (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Soetevent, 2005; Alpizar et al., 
2008; Samak and Sheremeta, 2013), which can be applied to real situations to understand, for example, 
how a company or organisation can collect more donations in an effective way. In order for Japan to 
become a more sustainable society in the future, the development of an SRI market could largely 
contribute to this by ensuring that more money flows into socially responsible firms, leading them to 
conduct further CSR activities without regulations that incur initial costs and other management costs. 
Along with technological developments and, the enactment of appropriate legislations and regulations is 
necessary to respond to the issues that society will eventually face, it is also important to structure society 
where socially responsible firms are evaluated in the financial market and investors can earn benefits 
from investing in such firms, which provide positive circulation for a better society, as well as greater 
profits to socially responsible firms and their investors. 
This thesis has mainly three research objectives. First, we aim to understand how the 
Japanese market evaluates CSR activities, by investigating whether Japanese investors appreciate, 
depreciate, are not interested in the firms announced as socially responsible leaders. Regarding a stability 
evaluation, we also compare the resilience of SRI and conventional investment toward the global 
financial crisis of 2008. The second goal is to identify whether SRI investors have any difference in 
psychological features. Third, we attempt to explore how people behave socially, investing in socially 
responsible firms, under the situation where private information is open. A further aim of the paper is to 
use our findings to propose ideas to enhance the SRI market in Japan. It could also provide useful 
information for policymakers who aims to develop SRI and provide wider knowledge of SRI for 
stakeholders.  
This paper is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 presents an examination of how Japanese 
investors evaluate CSR activities on a short-term basis. This analysis focuses on the specific event where 
the top 150 socially responsible firms are announced for inclusion in the SRI Index. Using the event study 
method, the quick response to such CSR-related news is analysed. In Chapter 3, we examine the impact 
of a specific negative event, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, on SRI funds and conventional funds. 
The survey of individual investors in Japan reveals that the most important determinant of investment is 
stability and reduced risk (Japan Securities Dealers Association, 2014). Hence, we examine the resilience 
of SRI compared to conventional investment toward the trigger of financial crisis. Then in Chapter 4, we 
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turn our attention to the psychological features of potential SRI investors, especially focusing on altruism, 
risk aversion, and time preference that are often research subjects, using laboratory economic experiments. 
We ask subjects to have 12 decision-makings for investments to identify who are potential SRI investors, 
and ask them to have another decision-makings to measure their altruism, risk aversion, and time 
preference. This data will be used to better understand what kind of psychological features make people 
choose SRI. Chapter 5 will use economic experiments to explore the situation in which people would like 
to invest in SRI, with a special focus on whether the social pressure to disclose subjects’ photo, ID, and 
information on their investment results significantly affects investment behaviour. We then briefly 
summarise our findings from Chapters 2 to 5, and present the implications of those results in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Sustainability Membership and Stock Price: An 
Empirical Study using the Morningstar-SRI Index  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Firms would like to know whether or not their investment in CSR will yield a profit. If 
investors in the share market appreciate CSR activity on the part of firms, the share prices of such firms 
will increase, and this would provide further incentive to firms to increase their CSR efforts. This 
beneficial interaction between investors and firms would lead to improvements in social welfare without 
government intervention. Investors have a significant role to play, therefore, in whether or not CSR 
becomes established in Japan. Hence, it is important to analyse how much value investors in Japan place 
on the efforts of firms in regard to CSR.  
Chapter 2 aims, by using the Morningstar Socially Responsible Investment (MS-SRI) Index 
as a proxy for the highest standard of CSR, to examine whether or not providing us the data used in the 
analysis. We assume that the market appreciates inclusion on the MS-SRI Index because it means that a 
firm is thus perceived to be one of the highest socially responsible firms. On the other hand, if a firm 
were removed from the MS-SRI Index, it would be penalised for its lower level of CSR activity. 
Consequently, we adopt the following hypothesis to carry out our study: the announcement of inclusion 
on the MS-SRI Index has a positive effect on the share price, whereas removal from the Index negatively 
affects the share price. We employ an event study methodology and a dummy regression analysis in our 
study. An event study is a widely used approach to analyse the effect of an unanticipated event on a share 
price. We adopt this methodology because we would like to know investors’ immediate response to the 
announcement of inclusion on or removal from the MS-SRI Index. In addition, studying the effect on 
share prices every year from 2003 to 2010 can identify any time-series change in the trend of investors’ 
views regarding CSR. Since CSR developed rapidly in Japan during these years, such an analysis would  
 
The earlier versions of this chapter have been presented at seminars held at the University of Kitakyushu and 
Kogakuin University. Helpful comments from seminar participants are gratefully acknowledged. We also thank 
Morningstar Japan K.K. for providing us the data used in the analysis.  
 10 
be appropriate. On the other hand, a dummy regression analysis will reveal the average effect on the share 
price of such announcements for the whole research period. Using these two approaches enables us to 
investigate changes in investors’ attitudes towards CSR through time as well as the average effect over 
eight years.  
The contribution of our study is threefold. First, we use a more appropriate proxy for 
CSR—the MS-SRI Index—since SRI indexes used in previous studies, especially the FTSE4Good UK 
Index, limited inclusion on those indexes to economically strong firms. As a result, changes in share 
prices could be due to investors’ appreciation of firms’ economic strength. The MS-SRI Index, however, 
does not restrict inclusion on the Index to big firms, so it can better reflect in share prices investor 
response to CSR. Second, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to analyse how Japanese 
investors respond to CSR-related announcements. Earlier studies examined markets where CSR has a 
much longer history than it has in Japan, and so reactions to announcements in such markets could differ 
from what happens in Japan. Finally, we study a longer period than was done in previous studies, and this 
gives a better grasp of the shift in investors’ attitudes towards CSR over time. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. In Section 2.2 we review previous studies that examined 
the share price reaction to levels of CSR in the US and Europe. Then in Section 2.3 we describe our data 
and explain our event study methodology and dummy regression analysis. Section 2.4 will present our 
empirical results, and the implications of those results are discussed in Section 2.5. We then briefly 
summarise our findings in Section 2.6. 
 
 
2.2 Previous Studies 
 
There are a few studies that examine how share prices react in the market to the 
announcement of a firm’s inclusion on an SRI index. For example, Curran and Moran (2007) used an 
event study to analyse the effect of the FTSE4Good UK Index on the prices of shares in the UK market. 
They investigated five announcements of inclusion on or removal from that index in 2001 and 2002. It 
was found that only one of the five events had any statistically significant effect, although in general the 
announcement of inclusion on the index brought in positive changes in the share price, while the 
announcement of removal led to negative changes. Therefore they concluded that the UK market did not 
appreciate CSR activities, nor did it punish the shares of firms that dropped down from a high-standard 
certification of CSR. However, because of the criteria for inclusion on that index, companies must belong 
to the top 50 largest in market capitalisation after the social screening. Hence, their study could not 
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control a change in share price that was possibly due to investors placing value on those firms’ economic 
strength.  
Consolandi et al. (2009) also used an event study methodology to investigate the effect on 
share prices of firms added to or removed from the Dow Jones Sustainability Stoxx Index (DJSSI), which 
covers European companies. As in Curran and Moran (2007), Consolandi et al. found that investors 
regarded inclusion on the DJSSI as good news and removal from it as bad news. In addition, they found 
that the market penalised an unexpected removal from the SRI index to a greater extent than it 
appreciated inclusion on the index. One of the possible reasons for this market reaction is that share prices 
might already have reflected all the available information, including the CSR level, and so the 
announcement of inclusion did not have a large impact on the share price. On the other hand, an 
unexpected removal from the index would result in significant negative responses by investors.  
Robinson et al. (2011) explored not only the short-term impact but also the intermediary 
impact on North American firms that were included on or removed from the Dow Jones Sustainability 
World Index (DJSI) using data from 2003 to 2007. It was revealed that inclusion on the DJSI led to 
intermediary positive effects on share price, while no immediate impact was observed. On the other hand, 
removal from the DJSI did not cause a significant fall in the immediate and intermediary share prices of 
firms. Contrary to the findings of Consolandi et al. (2009), they found that the response to inclusion on 
DJSI was greater than to removal from it. 
In this chapter we take a different approach from earlier studies in several ways. First, the 
MS-SRI Index is more appropriate than indexes used in other studies for the purpose of seeing more 
clearly the effects of CSR on share prices, because inclusion on those indexes was based not only on a 
firm’s high standard of CSR but also on its economic strength. In such a situation it becomes possible for 
investors to react to the criterion of economic valuation rather than to the social responsibility criterion. In 
the case of the MS-SRI Index, however, firms are selected by social screening from a universe of 3,600 
listed companies that includes relatively small corporate bodies. A more detailed comparison between 
SRI indexes is shown in Table 2.1 below. Second, previous studies analysed the markets of Europe and 
North America, where interest in CSR has a long history among investors. Although large numbers of 
firms in Japan are now implementing CSR actively, the concept of CSR is something relatively new to 
Japanese investors. For this reason this study can examine the impact on a firm’s share price resulting 
from that firm’s sustainability ranking in Japan, an impact that might be different from that in markets in 
Europe and North America. Japanese investors, for example, would react strongly to a firm’s inclusion on 
the MS-SRI Index because of the fact that CSR is still a novel practice for them. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of SRI Indexes 
 MS-SRI Index FTSE4Good UK DJSSI DJSI World Index 
Number of firms 150  50 Variable Variable 
Universe 3,600 listed firms The FTSE 
All-Share Index 
DJ Stoxx 600 
Index 
Largest 2,500 
firms in the DJ 
Global Total Stock 
Market Index 
Screening -Social Standard 
-Liquidity 
Standard 
-No negative 
screen 
-Environmental, 
social and 
stakeholder, and 
human rights  
-Negative screen 
-Top 50 firms by 
market 
capitalisation 
-The 20% most 
sustainable firms 
of each sector 
 
-The 10% most 
sustainable firms 
of each sector 
-Negative screen 
Market Japan United Kingdom Europe Worldwide  
Year established  2003 2001 2001 1999 
 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
We analysed the share prices of firms included on or removed from the MS-SRI Index. 
Launched in 2003, the MS-SRI Index is the first Japanese index of socially responsible investment.  
Once a year it publishes a list of 150 firms chosen from a base of 3,600 firms. If in the course of the year 
any of those 150 firms does something that negatively affects society, it would be removed from that 
index (as happened, for example, when the Tokyo Electric Power Company operating the Fukushima 
Nuclear Power Plants was removed on 6 April 2011). There are two criteria for inclusion in the Index: the 
social standard and the liquidity standard. The former consists of five principles: governance and 
accountability, market, employment, social contribution, and environment.  In selecting the candidate 
companies the MS-SRI Index does not employ a negative screening approach. While some other SRI 
indexes, such as the FTSE4Good UK Index, use screening of financial performance in addition to the 
social criteria, in the MS-SRI Index the 150 companies that best meet the social criteria are eligible for 
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inclusion. This allows greater opportunity for relatively smaller companies to be included in the MS-SRI 
Index.  
Morningstar provided us a list of the 150 companies selected from 2003 to 2010. For our 
analysis, we excluded the dead fund from our sample. We employed two methods of investigating the 
effects of inclusion on or removal from the MS-SRI Index: an event study and a dummy regression 
analysis. Our event study examines the relationship between a particular unanticipated event and changes 
in share prices. Since a public announcement of inclusion or removal is made once every year, there were 
eight events in our sample period from 2003 to 2010. For our sample, firms had to survive during the 
whole of the research periods shown in Table 2.2. Table 2.3 gives sample numbers for included firms and 
Table 2.4 gives sample numbers for removed firms. It is important to note that a firm must be included in 
the Index at least once before it can become a removed firm, and so the year 2003 is not the subject of our 
investigation for removal analysis.  
The dummy regression analysis investigates the average effect resulting from inclusion on or 
removal from the Index throughout the whole of a research period. While the annual data sets in the event 
study only contain share price data for the analysed year, in our dummy regression analysis we use all of 
the share price data as long as firms are included in the Index at least once. Consequently, our sample 
consists of the share prices of 239 included firms and those of 124 removed firms. Since some firms have 
included or removed more than once, the numbers of firms above are smaller than the aggregated 
numbers of inclusion or exclusion in Table 2.3 and 2.4. 
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Table 2.2 Research periods of event study analysis 
Year Announcement day Estimation window Event window 
2003 30th May  16th October (2002) – 28th May  29th May – 2nd June 
2004 1st September  26th January – 30th August 31st August – 2nd September 
2005 1st September 24th January – 30th August 31st August – 2nd September 
2006 1st September 26th January – 30th August 31st August – 4th September 
2007 1st September 25th January – 30th August 31st August – 4th September 
2008 1st September 24th January – 28th August 29th August – 2nd September 
2009 1st September 22nd January – 28th August 31st August – 2nd September 
2010 1st September 22nd January – 30th August 31st August – 2nd September 
 
Table 2.3 Sample numbers of firms included on MS-SRI Index, by year 
Year Number of Firms 
2003 122 
2004 130 
2005 132 
2006 136 
2007 137 
2008 140 
2009 142 
2010 148 
 
Table 2.4 Sample numbers of firms removed from MS-SRI Index, by year 
Year  Number of Firms 
2004 32 
2005 20 
2006 30 
2007 18 
2008 15 
2009 9 
2010 9 
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For the purpose of our event study we defined the three-day event windows shown in the last 
column of Table 2.2. Each event window is the period examined for any changes in the share prices of the 
firms involved. In addition, we determined that our estimation windows would be 150 transaction days 
before the event windows. First of all, we calculated the return of a share from its price: 
 
ri,t = log(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
)  (2.1) 
 
where ri,t  is the share return and Pi,t  is the share price on day t  for firm i . Next, we estimated the 
counterfactual return, that is, the return if the event does not occur, using data from the estimation 
windows. In order to calculate the counterfactual return, we estimated the market model, under the 
assumption that the return of the market index and the return of each share have the following linear 
relationship: 
 
ri,t =αi +βirm,t +εi,t,  (2.2) 
 
where rm,t  is the return of market proxy (TOPIX in our study) and αi  and βi  are unknown 
parameters. The residual has a zero mean and the variance is σ i
2 . With the estimated parameters, we can 
calculate the abnormal return (AR): the return obtained by subtracting the counterfactual return from the 
realised return. 
 
ARi,t = ri,t − (αˆi + βˆirm.t ),  (2.3) 
 
Although AR is calculated for each day of the three-day event window, we would like to obtain the total 
effect of the whole event window. Therefore, we needed to calculate the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) by adding the ARs of firm i  for each day of the event window. 
 
CARi (T−1,T1) = ARi,t.
t=T−1
T1
∑  
(2.4) 
 
In order to evaluate the average effect that the announcement of inclusion or removal had on a firm, we 
needed to calculate the averaged cumulative abnormal return (ACAR), as follows: 
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ACAR(T−1,T1) = CAR(T−1,T1) / N.
i=1
N
∑  
(2.5) 
 
The variance of ACAR can be obtained by using the following equation: 
 
VAR[ACAR(T−1,T1)]=
1
N 2 σˆ
2
i=1
N
∑ (T−1,T1).  
(2.6) 
 
Finally, we needed to test the null hypothesis that the event does not affect the share price, before 
assessing how the event does affect the share price, by estimating ACAR with the following J-statistics: 
 
J = ACAR(T−1,T1)1
N 2 σˆ
2 (T−1,T1)
i=1
N
∑
~ N(0,1).  
(2.7) 
 
While our event study methodology employs three-day event windows, our dummy 
regression analysis uses only a one-day event window, namely, the day of the announcement.  The 
market model of dummy regression is as follows: 
 
 (2.8) 
 
where Di  is the dummy variable taking one if the firm is added to or removed from the index; ri,t  and 
rm,t  are the returns of the share i  and the market proxy in period t , respectively; are 
unknown parameters;  E ν i,t!" #$= 0  and Var[υi,t ] = σ i2 .  Since the event occurs annually, the 
maximum frequency of ranking is eight for inclusion analysis and seven for removal analysis.  
 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
 
Results of event study 
 
Table 2.5 shows the ACARs of shares of firms included on the MS-SRI Index and the 
J-statistics to represent the statistical significance by each year. While the ACARs are significantly 
ri,t = ci + φirm,t + diDi,t +υi,t ,
ci ,φi ,di
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negative in 2003, 2004, and 2008, they are significantly positive in 2006 and 2007.  
 
  Table 2.5 ACARs of included-firms 
Year ACAR J-statistics 
2003 -0.005 -2.695*** 
2004 -0.004 -2.246** 
2005 0.001 0.988 
2006 0.004 3.522*** 
2007 0.005 3.753*** 
2008 -0.005 -3.030*** 
2009 0.003 1.547 
2010 0.000 0.316 
 
The empirical results of the effect on shares induced by removal of a firm from the Index are shown in 
Table 2.6. While more than half the ACARs in Table 2.5 are significant, Table 2.6 shows that only the 
ACAR of 2004 is significant. It reveals that share prices were not affected by an announcement of 
removal from the MS-SRI Index except in 2004.  
 
  Table 2.6 ACARs of removed-firms 
Year ACAR J-statistics 
2004 -0.007 -2.082** 
2005 0.005 1.673 
2006 0.004 1.586 
2007 0.003 0.836 
2008 -0.007 -1.324 
2009 0.003 0.397 
2010 0.005 1.228 
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Results of dummy regression analysis 
 
We used eq. (2.8) to estimate the impact on share prices of both inclusion on and removal 
from the Index. First of all, let us look at how inclusion on the MS-SRI Index affects share price. We 
found that 13 out of 239 firms showed a statistically significant effect, as shown in Table 2.7. Of these 13 
firms, nine exhibited a positive effect and four showed a negative effect. On the other hand, in line with 
the results of our event study, an announcement of removal from the MS-SRI Index did not affect the 
share price. Only 2 out of 124 firms showed a significant negative impact on their share prices, as we see 
in Table 2.8. In addition, these tables also break down the results on the basis of the frequency with which 
firms are included or removed. They show that the frequency of ranking in or out of the MS-SRI Index 
did not affect the direction of the result. 
 
 
Table 2.7 Impact on share price of inclusion, by frequency 
Frequency of 
Ranking 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
Number of 
Firms 
45 
(18%) 
25 
(10%) 
26 
(10%) 
24 
(10%) 
24 
(10%) 
14 
(5%) 
33 
(13%) 
48 
(20%) 
239 
(100%) 
Number of 
Significance 
3 
(23%) 
1 
(7%) 
2 
(14%) 
1 
(7%) 
2 
(14%) 
2 
(14%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(14%) 
13 
(100%) 
Positive 1 
(11%) 
1 
(11%) 
2 
(22%) 
1 
(11%) 
1 
(11%) 
2 
(22%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(11%) 
9 
(100%) 
Negative 2 
(50%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(25%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(25%) 
4 
(100%) 
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Table 2.8 Impact on share price of removal, by frequency 
Frequency of Deletion 1 2 3 4 Total 
Number of Firms 115 
(93%) 
9 
(7%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
124 
(100%) 
Number of Significance 2 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(100%) 
Positive 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(100%) 
Negative 2 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(100%) 
 
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
At this point we can discuss the key estimated results of our study: asymmetric reaction, 
different reactions from investors in Europe, and changes in investor behaviour towards CSR through 
time.  First of all, as discussed in the previous section, the results of the event study suggest that 
investors significantly reacted to the event of a firm’s inclusion on the MS-SRI Index. On the other hand, 
announcement of a firm’s removal from the Index did not effect a change in its share price. We found a 
similar result with the dummy regression analysis. Of the 239 firms that were added to the Index at least 
once, 13 showed a significant effect on share prices, while only 2 of the 124 firms removed from the 
Index experienced a significant change in their share prices. From this we can conclude that investors in 
the Japanese market in large part reacted to the announcement of a good assessment of CSR on the part of 
a firm, while they did not seem to consider removal from the Index a factor leading to a negative reaction.  
In regard to asymmetric reaction, we found that investors in Japan and Europe react 
differently to the inclusion on, or removal from, an SRI index. As we saw in Section 2.2, investors in 
Europe punished removal from such an index more than they rewarded inclusion on it (Curran and Moran, 
2007; Consolandi et al., 2009).  Our results, however, show that Japanese investors reacted positively to 
inclusion on the MS-SRI Index, whereas announcement of removal from the Index did not significantly 
affect a firm’s share price. This suggests to us that investors in Japan might not expect firms to implement 
socially responsible activities as much as investors in Europe do, therefore, they greatly appreciate the 
social contribution of firms. For exactly the same reason, they did not penalise firms that were removed 
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from the MS-SRI Index. The view obtained from our estimation reveals that investors in Japan have yet 
to consider CSR to be as indispensable an investment factor as investors in Europe do. Robinson et al. 
(2011) also found an asymmetric stronger response to inclusion on an SRI index in the US market, which 
shows that investors in the US evaluate CSR in a manner similar to Japanese investors. 
Finally, we can observe from the empirical results shown in Table 2.5 that investors in Japan 
have changed their attitudes towards CSR through time. In the first two years, 2003 and 2004, investors 
did not seem to understand fully what CSR was and how it affected the management of a firm. They did 
not properly appreciate the fact that implementing CSR adds to a firm’s costs and involves some sacrifice. 
However, ACAR turned positive the following year and has remained positive except for 2008. It can be 
argued that in earlier years investors valued CSR negatively because of ignorance regarding how CSR 
affects a firm’s operations, but that they gradually began to appreciate the socially friendly approaches of 
firms. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined, by using an event study and a dummy regression analysis, the impact 
on the share prices of Japanese firms of inclusion on, or removal from, the MS-SRI Index. While most 
results from inclusion on the Index were significantly positive, the announcement of removal from the 
Index did not lead to a significant drop in share prices. This suggests that investors in the Japanese market 
greatly appreciate the highest CSR standard of firms, while they did not react to removal from the Index 
when making their investment decisions. This result contrasts with what was found in a previous study 
using data from European countries (Consolandi et al., 2009) and suggests a difference of appreciation of 
CSR between investors in Japan and Europe. The results of our event study also indicated that the 
ACARs were negative in the earlier years but positive in later years. This could be due to less 
appreciation of the concept of CSR by investors when it was introduced into Japanese society. In later 
years, as the benefits of CSR became better appreciated, however, investors began to evaluate inclusion 
on an SRI index positively.  
Previous studies revealed that inclusion on an SRI index has positive impacts on the share 
prices of firms in the European and US markets (Curran and Moran, 2007; Consolandi et al., 2009; and 
Robinson et al., 2011). Our study also showed that being sustainability leaders has been evaluated 
positively by investors. The result suggests that CSR activities are not merely altruistic activities for the 
benefit of society, but they could also contribute to the ultimate objective of corporate bodies, that of 
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maximizing their own value. This could persuade firms to enhance CSR activities in Japan. Although 
inclusion on the MS-SRI Index was negatively evaluated in the beginning, it can be seen in a positive 
light after some years of trial. Such a result will prove important for countries that are going to introduce 
CSR activities from now on. 
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Chapter 3 
Are SRI Funds More Resilient towards the Global 
Financial Crisis?  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 The global recession after the subprime crisis has dealt a crippling below to the economy not 
only in the United States but all over the world. Since 2007, the potential global writedowns on loans and 
securities due to this financial crisis were estimated be 4.1 trillion US dollars (IMF, 2009). The falls in 
GDP from 2008 to 2009 were -2.6 per cent, -4.1 per cent, -5.2 per cent and -4.9 per cent in the US, Euro 
Area, Japan and the UK, respectively (IMF, 2010). The unemployment rate in the United States reached 
to the 9.6 per cent in 2010 (United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Major 
economic indicators show the seriousness of the impact of the financial crisis: without doubt it has been 
the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression in 1929. 
 One of the causes of the economic crisis was subprime lending, which was intended for 
low-income households or subprime borrowers and which would inevitably lead to defaults. The loans 
were securetised into wide-ranging financial commodities not be able to track who should be response for 
defaults. Investment behaviour focusing extensively on short-term economic gains has compounded the 
problem. While there are calls for remedying the situation by tighten regulation of, and governance over 
financial institutions, there already exists a self-regulation mechanism in the market that is potentially 
effective in enhancing corporate activity for social profit: that is, Socially Responsible Investments, often 
called as SRI.  
 There exists a considerable number of academic studies that compare SRI and conventional 
investments. These studies can be divided into two categories. The first category discusses whether or not 
SRI funds outperform or underperform funds that are not socially screened. The general finding from 
those studies is that the difference between SRI funds and conventional funds is not statistically 
significant as discussed in Chapter 1, although it depends on the time and area analysed. 
 More recently, Bollen (2007) raised the interesting question, whether investor behaviours in 
SRI funds and conventional funds are different: this brings us to the second category of studies on SRI. 
He examined the relation between fund flows and return for SRI funds in the US. It was found that SRI 
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funds were more sensitive to lagged positive returns than conventional funds, whilst SRI investors 
exhibited a smaller response to negative returns than investors in conventional funds for the period 1980 
through 2002. Further, he showed that flow volatility was lower in SRI funds than in conventional funds 
for the period 1991 to 2002. In other words, it can be said that investors in SRI funds are more loyal 
investors than those in conventional funds. 
 While Bollen (2007) focused on the single relationship between past returns and money flows 
for US SRI funds, Renneboog et al. (2011) expanded the analysis by investigating whether or not the 
investment decision was made not only with past returns in mind but also with other factors such as fund 
size, age, risk, and the fee structure. Their main findings were that investors in SRI funds chased past 
returns, return rankings, and persistence in performance the same as conventional investors did. Just as 
Bollen (2007) had found, investors in SRI funds did not mind negative returns that much more than 
positive returns, unless poor performance persisted. In addition, higher money inflows were induced by 
smaller, younger funds or funds belonging to the large-fund families. They also showed that higher 
intensity of screenings attracted more inflows than otherwise: however, some types of screening such as 
environmental screens or ethical screens, lowered cash flows. On the other hand, the volatility of money 
flows in SRI funds was greater that in conventional funds unless poor performance persisted. Furthermore, 
they indicated smaller, younger or riskier SRI funds were associated with a higher magnitude of volatility 
of money flows than conventional funds were. 
 Benson and Humphrey (2008) provided further insight into SRI investor behaviour by 
incorporating both monthly and annual returns in order to investigate if investors react to current and/or 
past information, and also by incorporating lagged flow to take into account the persistence of fund flow. 
The flow of SRI funds was a negative function of current, past, and lagged returns, unlike the 
conventional fund flow. This suggested that SRI investors cared about returns less than their conventional 
counterparts; this would accord with the hypothesis that investors in SRI funds obtain some additional 
non-financial utility. The lagged flow was significantly positive and its coefficient was larger than that of 
the conventional one. This means that SRI funds flows were more persistent than conventional funds. 
Therefore it seems likely that investors in SRI funds reinvest in funds they have already owned. Benson 
and Humphrey also investigated the differences in the flow-performance relation for the best and worst 
performing funds. While conventional fund investors responded to a good performance greatly but 
reacted less to a poor performance, SRI fund investors were less sensitive to performance than 
conventional fund investors were. 
 Whereas there has been considerable research on SRI in most of advanced nations, very little 
has been analysed about the Japanese SRI market. Jin et al. (2006) is one of the few studies that examined 
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the performance of SRI as exploring the possible roles for SRI in pension portfolios in Japan. They 
compared the performance between hypothetical SRI index and market index, respectively to be 
comparable without inconsistencies among indices. It was found that there were no big differences 
between these indices. Additionally, they explored with a stock-by-stock panel data analysis that SRI 
added the excess return in the period before the first SRI index was launched in Japan, however, holding a 
SRI portfolio brought less return in the post period. This means that including SRI portfolios into pension 
funds would not bring any additional benefits to pension participants in Japan. However, the estimated 
results could not be consistent with the current situation as data they analysed was relatively old. With 
regard to the comparison of investor behaviour between SRI funds and conventional funds, Renneboog et 
al. (2011) mentioned about the Japanese case as the sample of the rest of world. Therefore, it cannot be 
exactly known how the investment behaviour in Japan was differed between investors of SRI funds and 
conventional funds. It thus remains unknown how exactly investment behaviour in Japan structurally 
differs in terms of SRI and conventional funds. 
In response, this chapter compares SRI and conventional funds from a perspective other than 
that of the abovementioned studies—namely, their reaction to financial crisis. The findings of earlier 
studies suggest that investors do not consider SRI to constitute costs, at least because there is no 
difference in performance between SRI and conventional funds. In terms of investor behaviour, SRI 
investors are more loyal than conventional investors, since SRI funds are more sensitive to lagged 
positive returns but less so to negative returns. Taking these results into consideration, we expect that, 
though most counties worldwide have recently experienced a significant economic downturn, SRI 
investors might retain their funds instead of selling them. In this sense, the performance of SRI might 
have suffered from the financial crisis; however, if CSR activity was evaluated positively by the market, 
then the decrease in the returns of SRI would be lower than those of conventional investments. We 
therefore articulated the hypothesis that SRI funds have been able to better resist the negative impact of 
the recent global recession than conventional funds, particularly in Japan.  
To examine this hypothesis, we adopted event study methodology. Event studies cast light on 
how unanticipated events impact changes in fund prices, given that the market is efficient. The 
unanticipated event focused on here is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a critical moment during the 
global financial crisis that triggered further drops in stock prices and even greater economic losses. 
Among the few studies with a similar research objective, Nofsinger and Varma (2014) compared the 
performance of US SRI and conventional mutual funds during periods of crisis—namely, March 2000 to 
October 2002 as the technology bubble burst, and October 2007 to March 2009 as the global financial 
crisis—and periods of non-crisis that was one other than two crisis periods during 2000-2011. Their 
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estimation results showed that, during the crises, SRI funds significantly outperformed conventional ones, 
whereas the opposite result emerged during the non-crisis period. They added that this asymmetric pattern 
was driven by SRI funds stipulating environmental, social and governance (ESG) positive screening.  
More recently, Becchetti et al. (2015) examined the performance of SRI and conventional 
funds, albeit in different markets, during the period January 1992–April 2012 with both a market model 
and a multifactor model. They found that, during the global financial crisis from December 2007–June 
2009, SRI funds also significantly outperformed conventional ones in all markets except those in North 
America, yet did not differ when the technology bubble burst during March–November 2001. Moreover, 
they expanded their findings by revealing that the limited diversification constraint did not notably lower 
SRI performance. 
At the same time, Leite and Cortez (2015) compared the performance of SRI and 
conventional funds during periods of market crisis in France: the period until the technology bubble burst 
(January 2001–March 2003), the global financial crisis (June 2007–February 2009), and the euro 
sovereign debt crisis (May 2011–May 2012). Their principal finding was that SRI funds significantly 
underperformed compared to conventional funds during non-crisis periods, which aligns with Nofsinger 
and Varma’s (2014) results. Unlike Nofsinger and Varma (2014), however, Leite and Cortez (2015) 
discovered that the difference between SRI and conventional funds was not statistically significant during 
crises; though SRI funds achieved returns comparable to those of conventional funds during crisis, they 
could not provide additional protection to investors at the time. These authors also demonstrated that the 
inferior performance of SRI during non-crisis periods was spurred by funds employing negative 
screenings, for SRI funds with positive screenings showed no significant differences in performance 
when compared with conventional funds.  
Although these studies provide a broad perspective on the resilience of SRI funds during 
crisis, they have also all identified long-term periods of market crisis lasting 1–2 years. In this sense, their 
results could have accommodated the effects of other events or factors on fund performance during times 
of crisis. In contrast to these studies, our study identifies events lasting three days only, meaning that 
results can show the immediate effect of financial crisis on fund performance. According to a survey of 
individual investors in Japan (Japan Securities Dealers Association, 2014), the most important 
determinant of investment is stability and low risk. From this angle, the present study can provide 
information useful to stakeholders in exploring the resilience of SRI from short-term perspective on top 
of mid-, and long-term perspectives that earlier studies looked from. Although the Japanese SRI market 
remains at a developing stage, an assessment of the potential impact of SRI is worthwhile, given its 
expected growth due to the steady growth of pension funds. Since studies of Japanese SRI performance 
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(Itoh et al., 2013; Nakai et al., 2013; Nakajima, 2011) have nevertheless not investigated how market 
crisis impacts fund performance, our study can fill a gap in current knowledge of SRI, especially in Japan. 
The principal findings of this chapter are that the abnormal impact of the recent global 
financial crisis on SRI funds was significantly positive, while that on conventional funds was 
significantly negative estimated by Fama–French three-factor model (Fama & French, 1993); and that the 
greater resilience of SRI funds in Japan amid the global financial crisis has been induced by international 
SRI funds. Other recent studies (Leite & Cortez, 2015; Nofsinger & Varma, 2014) have examined 
whether the types of screening prompt any difference in performance, largely because SRI funds in 
European countries or the United States exhibit a variety of screenings. At the same time, Japanese SRI 
funds identified by the Japan Sustainable Investment Forum (JSIF) have employed positive screening and 
focus mostly on environmental issues.8 We therefore do not investigate the effect of differences in 
screening on fund performance.  
 The rest of this chapter is composed as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3 
introduces the event study methodology along with EGARCH model and the Fama-French three-factor 
model. Estimated results are summarised in Section 3.4. The implication of results are discussed in 
Section 3.5. The Section 3.6 summarises our findings. 
 
 
3.2 Data 
 
 The history of SRI funds in Japan is far brief than that of similar funds in Europe and the 
United States. Early SRI funds were eco-funds launched in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the same time 
during which attention to environmental problems escalated noticeably (Dentsu Macromill Insight, 2012). 
Eco-funds were imported from the West as new financial products as part of the push to introduce new 
market mechanisms for intermediate cash flow from households into SRIs (Sakuma & Louche, 2008). 
                                            
8 SRI funds analysed in this study exhibit a few notable features. First, none use the exclusion approach according to 
the JSIF classification rule. Second, only four of the 62 SRI funds focus on issues other than environment-related 
ones; three SRI funds—namely, the Amundi Risona Woman J Fund, Amundi Womenomics Balance Kabushiki 30 
(monthly distribution type), and Amundi Womenomics Balance Kabushiki 30 (active growth)—actively invest in 
firms in which numerous women have played important roles or that provide goods or services to women, while the 
Mitsubishi UFJ SRI Fund actively invests in family-friendly firms in which employees can choose flexible working 
hours in order to strike better life–work balances, as based on an evaluation by the Good Bankers Co., Ltd. The 58 
other funds focus on environmental issues in some way; 17 of them pose CSR as a screening criterion, 10 pose ESG, 
and eight pose environmental issues. By contrast, some funds specify their interest of screening to be climate change 
or sustainable energy. It should be noted that CSR activities of Japanese firms encompass environmental 
conservation efforts, meaning that most SRI funds in the present study have adopted a homogeneous screening 
strategy. We therefore conclude examining the impact of differences in screening criteria on performance is 
unnecessary. 
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This situation differs drastically from that in the United States and Europe, where SRI has religious roots. 
Furthermore, though many SRI investors in Europe and the United States are basically institutional 
investors, especially in pension funds, most SRI in Japan occurs in publicly offered SRI funds targeting 
individual investors. 
 Figure 3.1 shows changes in the number of publicly offered SRI funds in Japan and their total 
net assets in billion US dollars (Japan Sustainable Investment Forum, 2015). In the beginning of the SRI 
market in Japan, there were only a few funds. Both the number of funds and their total net assets have 
steadily been growing, though there was a sudden considerable decrease in 2008 due to the financial 
crisis. Total net assets of the SRI funds amount to 10 billion US dollars as of the end of December 2011; 
this represents only 0.2 per cent of the Japanese mutual market, a smaller share than in Europe and the US, 
where SRI funds represent more than 10 per cent of those mutual fund markets (Japan Sustainable 
Investment Forum, 2013). The main screening has been directed at the environmental aspect since 2007; 
it is reported that, as of 2013, more than 70 per cent of SRI funds are environmentally screened (Japan 
Sustainable Investment Forum, 2014).  
 
Figure 3.1: The Number of SRI Funds and Total Net Assets in Japan 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the number of conventional funds and their total net assets in Japan (The Investment 
Trusts Association, Japan, 2010). While the SRI fund market in Japan is still developing, the conventional 
fund market seems to have already matured, hence there has been no rapid increase in the number and net 
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assets of conventional funds. The conventional funds experienced a slight drop in the total net assets, 
compared to that of SRI funds, and their number has been gradually increasing since 2004.  
 
Figure 3.2: The Number of Conventional Funds and Total Net Assets in Japan 
 
 
 To conduct our analysis, we used data on the value of funds and on the market portfolio. The 
daily return data of publicly offered investment trusts is available from the Investment Trusts Association 
Japan, which gives a sample of 3,824 funds as of the end of July 2010. Data on privately offered 
investment trusts are unavailable and therefore these were not included in our sample. We used the Japan 
Sustainable Investment Forum classification to identify SRI funds, of which there are 89 listed for the 
same time. An additional condition was that the funds had to be surviving during the whole of the 
research period, which was from 7th of February through 17th of September in 2008. As a result, our data 
covers 2,136 conventional funds and 62 SRI funds (for these latter, see Appendix 3A). Funds can be also 
classified into domestic or international funds. Domestic funds are mutual funds that invest stocks and/or 
bonds of mainly domestic companies, whilst international funds largely invest those of companies outside 
the country. In accordance with the criteria, there are 793 domestic conventional funds and 24 domestic 
SRI funds. International funds have 1,343 conventional funds and 38 SRI funds (See Table 3.1). We used 
the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX), Russel Nomura Large Cap Growth Index, Russel Nomural Large 
Cap Value Index, Russel Nomura Small Cap Growth Index, Russel Nomura Small Cap Value Index and 
Japan benchmark 10 year Government Index to construct the market premium index, SMB index, and 
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HML index to conduct the Fama-French three-factor model, which is discussed in 3.3.3 for more details. 
All data was downloaded from Datastream. Table 3.2 gives the descriptive statistics for the fund returns 
of SRI funds, conventional funds, and other indexes. The fund return is calculated as eq. (3.1) in Section 
3.3.1. Therefore, each fund has 152 returns in this period. The basic statistics shows that the average 
return and standard deviation of both types of funds were similar in the whole period.  
 
Table 3.1: Sample Numbers 
 Domestic International Total 
SRI 24 38 62 
Conventional 793 1343 2136 
Total 817 1381 2198 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
SRI 9,424 -0.0009 0.0150 -0.0672 0.0661 
Conventional 
Market Proxy 
(TOPIX) 
325,128 
152 
-0.0009 
-0.0001 
0.0135 
0.0168 
-0.1852 
-0.0519 
0.1131 
0.1131 
Market 
Premium 
152 -0.0013 0.0206 -0.0644 0.0570 
SMB Index 152 0.0001 0.0067 -0.0206 0.0266 
HML Index 152 0.0005 0.0045 -0.0079 0.0169 
 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Event Study Methodology with OLS 
 
 Event study methodology was introduced by Fama et al. (1969) for the purpose of examining 
the relationship between a particular unanticipated event and changes in the stock prices. Numerous 
studies have analysed whether or not either a positive or a negative CSR-related event has an impact on a 
corporation’s share price (Arora, 2001; Gupta and Goldar, 2005; Hamilton, 1995; Takeda and Tomozawa, 
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2006, 2008; Yamaguchi, 2008; Yamaguchi, 2009). The validity of an event study relies on a few 
assumptions: the notion of market efficiency; the unexpectedness of the event; and the nonexistence of 
other events that could affect the share price during the event chosen for analysis (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). In order to conduct our event study, we needed to define the event window, that is, the period 
examined for changes in fund price. We set three days as our event window: the day before the event, the 
day of the event, and the day after the event. The event window is normally set for a period longer than 
the day of the event in order to include any changes in the fund price resulting from information leaked 
before the event happened, and to include the investment action taken by latecomers on the day following 
the event.  
 Since the Japanese market was closed on 15th September 2008 due to public holiday, we 
identify the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 16th of September 2008 as the event day (designated here 
as T0 ), designated the last transaction day before the event (12th of September) as T−1 , and designated 
the transaction day following the event (17th of September) as T+1 . Additionally, we used the fund price 
data for 150 transaction days before the event window as our estimation window. Using the following 
formula, we calculate the fund returns from fund prices: 
 
                               ri,t = log(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
)                             (3.1) 
 
where ri,t  is the fund return and Pi,t  is the fund price on day t  for firm i . Next, we need to 
estimate the normal return, which is the counterfactual return if the event does not occur. There is an 
assumption that the return of the market proxy (TOPIX in this study) and the return of each fund have a 
linear relationship. In order to calculate the normal return, αi  and βi  should be estimated in the 
market model with data from the estimation window, as shown below: 
 
                                ri,t =αi +βirm,t +εi,t,                           (3.2) 
 
where  E[εi,t ]= 0 and Var εi,t!" #$=σ 2(εi,t ) ; rm,t  is return of the market index; αi  and βi  are 
unknown parameters. With estimated parameters, normal return for each of three-day event window can 
be estimated; subtracting this from the realised return gives abnormal return (AR). 
 
 31 
                             ARi,t = ri,t − (αˆi + βˆirm.t ),                         (3.3) 
 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated after adding the abnormal returns of firm i  for 
three-day event window. 
  
                                 CARi (T−1,T1) = ARi,t.
t=T−1
T1
∑                        (3.4) 
 
The CARs can be analysed over the whole sample in the same category, called ACAR (averaged 
cumulative abnormal return) as follows:  
 
                            ACAR(T−1,T1) = CAR(T−1,T1) / N.
i=1
N
∑                  (3.5) 
 
The variance of the averaged cumulative return can be obtained as follows: 
 
                         VAR[ACAR(T−1,T1)]=
1
N 2 σˆ
2
i=1
N
∑ (T−1,T1).                 (3.6) 
 
Once ACAR is obtained, we need to test the null hypothesis that the event does not have any impact on 
the fund returns, by using the following J-statistics: 
 
                             J = ACAR(T−1,T1)1
N 2 σˆ
2 (T−1,T1)
i=1
N
∑
~ N(0,1).                    (3.7) 
 
If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, it becomes meaningless to interpret the value of ACAR. 
 
3.3.2 Event Study Methodology with EGARCH  
 
 Most earlier studies listed in 3.3.1 used an event study methodology that does not account for 
heteroskedasticity. The standard market model assumes that the residuals of share price are simply white 
noise. However, financial time series data such as share prices or exchange rates generally have 
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nonconstant variance. An Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model (Engle, 1982) 
and a more extended version of the ARCH morel, Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) processes (Bollerslev, 1986) were introduced to account for 
heteroskedasticity. In several earlier studies, GARCH model was employed to estimate time-varying 
conditional variance, but it has some limitations (for example, it imposes the nonnegative restriction on 
the estimators). On the other hand, the Exponential General Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model introduced by Nelson (1991) does not assume the nonnegative 
constraint when using a natural logarithm, so it is superior to the GARCH model since the nonnegative 
conditions are often violated by estimators. We use the EGARCH (1,1) model to confirm that the result 
from OLS methodology is robust. In the same manner as in the OLS model, parameters must be estimated 
to calculate the normal return. The error term is divided into the independent white noise and the standard 
error: 
 
                              ri,t =αi +βirm,t +εi,t,                            (3.8) 
 
where εi,t = hi,tν i,t The variance of the standard error, called the conditional variance, can be shown 
as 
 
                         (3.9) 
 
where εi,t Ωt ~ N(0,hi,t )  and Ω  is the information set at time t  on which the distribution of 
errors is assumed to be conditioned. This is well known as the conditional variance equation in the 
EGARCH (1,1) model. The abnormal returns, the cumulative abnormal returns, and the averaged 
cumulative abnormal returns are estimated in same manner as in OLS.  
 In order to obtain the standardised residual terms, we need to calculate the conditional 
variance in each three-day event window for firm i  using estimated parameters in eq. (3.9) and using 
data from the estimation window. Once the conditional variances for each event window are calculated 
for firm i , we can take the exponential for each of them and find the average over the three-days, and 
then we can obtain the averaged conditional variance for firm i  as follow 
 
log(hi,t ) =ω i +α1,i
εi,t−1
hi,t−1
+α2,i
εi,t−1
hi,t−1
+ βi log(hi,t−1),
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hi (T−1,T1) =
exp(hˆi,T−1 )+ exp(hˆi,T0 )+ exp(hˆi,T1 )
3 .                  (3.10) 
 
The variance of the averaged cumulative return can be obtained as follows. 
 
                       VAR[ACAR(T−1,T1)]=
1
N 2 hii=1
N
∑ (T−1,T1).                 (3.11) 
 
Finally, we need to test the null hypothesis that event does not have any impact on the fund returns, by 
using the following J-statistics: 
 
                    J = ACAR(T−1,T1)
1
N 2 hi (T−1,T1)i=1
N
∑
~ N(0,1).                       (3.12) 
 
3.3.3 Event Study Methodology with Fama-French Three-factor Model 
 
 There are possibilities that characteristics of firms in SRI funds could be different from the 
ones in conventional funds. In fact, Luther et al. (1992) showed that ethical funds in the United Kingdom 
are largely investments to smaller firms. Besides, it is also mentioned that ethical trusts have a wider 
variation of international diversification and offer lower dividend yields. Based on findings in their 
previous paper, Luther and Matatko (1994) utilised a multifactor model with both a market and small 
company index as well as a single factor model to estimate the abnormal return and it turns out that the 
model accounting for a size effect should be employed. Other studies with SRI funds in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (Bauer et al., 2005), Australian SRI funds (Bauer et al., 2006), 
SRI funds in Canada (Bauer et al., 2007) , and SRI funds and Green funds in the United States (Climent 
et al., 2011) also pointed out the multifactor evaluation model is more valid for assessing the fund 
performance since SRI funds were observed to have a significant higher or lower exposure to size factor, 
value factor and momentum factor than conventional funds.  
 If our data has similar biases as other countries’ data of earlier studies, the multifactor model 
must be employed to our analysis, too. Firstly, we need to check whether those factors have a significant 
effect on the return of funds. We follow the study of Faff (2004) to construct the Fama-French “SMB” 
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and “HML” factors using existing style indexes that are Russel Nomura Large Cap Growth Index, Russel 
Nomura Large Cap Value Index, Russel Nomura Small Cap Growth Index, and Russel Nomura Small 
Cap Value Index developed by Global Research Division, the Nomura Securities Co., Ltd and Russell 
Investments.9 SMB stands for “Small Minus Big” that enables us to control for small-effect based on the 
idea that firms with smaller market capitalisation can earn higher return than bigger firms in the financial 
market. The proxy of SMB at time t  is obtained as following: 
 
                     SMBt =
RSVt + RSGt
2
!
"
#
$
%
&−
RLVt + RLGt
2
!
"
#
$
%
&                      (3.13) 
 
where RSVt  is the return on the Russel Nomura Small Cap Value Index at time t ; RSGt  is the return 
on the Russel Nomura Small Cap Growth Index at time t ; RLVt  is the return on the Russel Nomura 
Large Cap Value Index at time t ;RLGt  is the return on the Russel Nomura Large Cap Growth Index at 
time t . Another Fama-French factor, HML (High Minus Low) shows the difference in the return 
between the firm with a high book to market ratio (often called as value stock) minus the one with a low 
book to market ratio (so-called growth stocks). HML at time t  can be constructed as below: 
 
                      HMLt = (
RLVt + RSVt
2 )− (
RLGt + RSGt
2 ).                        (3.14) 
 
Using SMBt and HMLt  proxies, we estimated the expected return with a multifactor model to 
ascertain the effects of these variables on fund return and compare them in terms of SRI and conventional 
funds, according to the following: 
 
           
ri,t − rf ,t =αi +β1iMarketPremiumi,t +β2iSMBt +β3iHMLt
               + β4id _ SRI * MarketPremiumi,t +β5id _ SRI *SMBt
               + β6id _ SRI *HMLt +εi,t
      
    (3.15) 
 
Market Premium can be calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate  calculated from the 
10-Year Japanese Government Bond Index from the market portfolio. If the coefficients of β1i,β2i,β3i
are estimated to be significant, then the variables have to be controlled for according to event study 
                                            
9 See http://qr.nomura.co.jp/QR/FRCNRI/frnri_info.html for more details. 
rf ,t
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methodology. An interaction term among the three factors and a dummy variable d_SRI were included as 
d_SRI *Market Premium, d_SRI*SMB, and d_SRI*HML, in which the dummy variable equalled 1 if the 
fund group was an SRI fund and 0 if the fund group was a conventional fund. This technique enabled us 
to investigate whether these risk exposures differ significantly between SRI and conventional funds.  
 
Table 3.3: Regression results using the Fama–French model 
 Coeff. Std. Err. 
Constant 
Market Premium 
0.0001*** 
0.8917*** 
0.0000 
0.0011 
SMB 0.64776*** 0.0035 
HML -0.29115*** 0.00527 
d_SRI*Market Premium 0.4083*** 0.00672 
d_SRI*SMB 
d_SRI*HML 
-0.3976** 
-0.0891*** 
0.0210 
0.0312 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
As shown in Table 3.3, all variables and interactions with the SRI dummy have statistically 
significant coefficient. We thus concluded that the Fama–French three-factor model should be applied. 
The coefficient of market premium and that interacted with the SRI dummy was statistically significant 
and positive, indicating that SRI funds had greater exposure to the market premium than conventional 
funds, a finding consistent with the results of earlier studies encompassing crisis periods (Becchetti et al., 
2015; Leite & Cortez, 2015; Nofsinger & Varma, 2014).  
Our finding that the SMB factor was significantly positive at the 1% level indicated to us that 
funds comprising smaller firms’ stock are more likely to obtain larger returns than their counterparts, 
which marks a small effect. By contrast, the coefficient of d_SRI*SMB showed that SRI funds were less 
exposed to small effects than conventional ones, a finding consistent with the results of Leite and Cortez 
(2015). As Leite and Cortez (2014) earlier showed, since their sample of French funds was mostly 
screened with best-in-class strategies, larger, well-established companies could thus be selected as the 
best companies for CSR. SRI funds in Japan are also identified with either positive screening or 
best-in-class, meaning that SRI funds in Japan and France are less exposed to SMB effect than 
conventional funds.  
At the same time, the coefficients of HML became statistically significant and negative at the 1% 
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level, suggesting that funds in our study are more growth- than value-oriented, which runs counters to the 
results of Nofsinger and Varma (2014) and Leite and Cortez (2015), yet is similar to those of Becchetti et 
al (2015). Furthermore, the negative coefficient of d_SRI*HML underscores that that SRI funds are more 
growth-oriented than conventional ones.  
To render the Fama–French model applicable to the event study, we estimated parameters 
with eq. (3.15) instead of eq. (3.2) and calculated the abnormal return for each three-day event window, 
as follows: 
 
  
ARi,t = ri,t − αˆi + βˆ1i (rm,t − rf ,t )+ βˆ2iSMBt + βˆ3iHMLt +εi,t."# $%    (3.16) 
 
Eq. (3.16) is equivalent to eq. (3.3) of the market model. We can take the exactly same step as the Market 
Model afterwards to examine whether the event significantly affect the fund price with eq. (3.4) to eq. 
(3.7). 
 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
 As we confirmed in 3.3.3 that Fama-French factor did have effect on performance of SRI and 
conventional funds, we mainly discuss the estimation results of the model in this section. Unlike the 
empirical results with other two models (discussed later in this section), the ACAR of SRI funds is 
significantly positive (0.0026) at the 5% level, while the one of conventional funds remains significantly 
negative (-0.0069) at the 1% level. Therefore, we reject that the null hypothesis that the event did not 
have any effect on the funds. The difference of those ACARs is also significant at the 1% level (See the 
Table 3.4). Hence, we conclude that SRI fund is more resilient towards the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. The result can be interpreted that investors did not sell out SRI funds even under the difficult 
situation, while they seemed to sell off conventional funds. 
The resilience of SRI towards the collapse of Lehman Brothers was also found in OLS and 
EGARCH model. Although, the ACARs of SRI funds are negative in these models, the absolute value is 
smaller than the ACARs of conventional funds. This means the impact of the bankruptcy of Lehman 
brothers on SRI funds was less severe than that on conventional funds. With the OLS model, the 
difference in the ACARs between SRI funds and conventional funds is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. We also applied the EARCH model since the stock price data often contains the heteroskedasticity. 
 37 
We conducted an ARCH-LM test for all of the data and found that 24 out of 62 SRI funds and 1,003 out 
of 2,139 conventional funds have ARCH effects. (The results of the ARCH-LM test for SRI funds are 
shown in Appendix 3B). Since it is confirmed that there exists an ARCH-effect in a considerable number 
of funds, we also analysed the data using the EGARCH (1,1) model, and we obtained the similar results 
with the OLS model. 
 In order to analyse how serious this negative shock was, we would have to compare the 
obtained ACARs with other event studies. Unfortunately, there have been no other event studies using 
fund data that we know of. Comparison of the impact of the financial crisis on SRI funds with other 
events that might affect the returns of SRI funds would require further study. 
 
Table 3.4: Comparisons of ACAR 
The Type of Fund OLS EGARCH Fama-French Model 
SRI Fund -0.0034*** 
(-3.0408) 
-0.0024** 
(-1.7236) 
0.0026** 
(1.9031) 
Conventional Fund -0.0112*** 
(-56.5757) 
-0.0110*** 
(-41.3268) 
-0.0069*** 
(-25.2622) 
Difference 0.0078** 
[2.2420] 
0.0086*** 
[5.3272] 
0.0095*** 
[2.7442] 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
Numbers in parentheses and square brackets are J statistics and t statistics, respectively. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion: Domestic versus International Funds 
 
It remains unclear why the impact of the recent global financial crisis on SRI funds was less than 
that upon conventional funds. One possible reason is that investors might have supposed that any 
company targeting CSR would be one with a sound long-term strategy and hence a more forward-looking 
firm than its counterparts, since its goods or services could be differentiated in terms of long-term 
environmental or social aspects from an understanding that it incurs a short-term expense complementing 
CSR activities. In this case, investors might believe that such a firm could be more likely to weather a 
financial crisis, which is consistent with the idea that CSR activity is a factor that can induce stable, 
growing development for firms (Scalet & Kelly, 2010). Consequently, SRI funds would have been sold 
less than conventional ones on the day of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. To explore this idea, the 
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present section focuses on the differences of investment destination to explain why SRI funds have been 
more resilient during the financial crisis than conventional funds.  
In our study, we classified funds as either domestic or international funds. Domestic funds are 
mutual funds that invest in the stocks and/or bonds of domestic companies, whereas international funds 
invest in both domestic and foreign companies or in foreign companies only. If investors behave 
differently toward domestic SRI and international SRI funds, then they also respond differently to 
financial shock sustained by these funds. We estimated ACAR values with the OLS, EGARCH, and 
Fama–French three-factor model, yet separately for the group of domestic funds and the group of 
international funds. We first found that the most ACARs of domestic funds were estimated to be negative 
with all models. Besides, the collapse of Lehman Brothers dropped the return of SRI funds more than that 
of conventional funds, though the difference between the two funds was statistically significant only with 
the EGARCH model, as Table 3.5 shows. Second, the ACAR of international SRI funds by Fama–French 
three-factor model turned significantly positive and the difference between ACARs of SRI and 
conventional funds is significant at the 1% level, which is a result similar to that estimated with the entire 
sample. The result might thus indicate that an increase in SRI performance could be induced by the 
resilience of international SRI funds, possibly because international funds can enjoy a greater 
diversification of investment opportunities than domestic ones. As a result, the impact of financial shock 
on domestic SRI funds and domestic conventional funds might become similar. 
 
Table 3.5: 
 Comparison of average cumulative abnormal return of domestic and international funds 
 Domestic International 
 Ordinary 
least 
squares 
EGARCH Fama–
French 
model 
Ordinary 
least 
squares 
EGARCH Fama–
French 
model 
SRI funds -0.0015*** 
(-2.7269) 
-0.0016*** 
(-5.9867) 
-0.0006 
(-0.8911) 
-0.0045*** 
(-2.5418) 
-0.0003* 
(-1.3304) 
0.0046*** 
(2.0954) 
Conventional funds -0.0002 
(-1.1822) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.3242) 
0.0000 
(0.1709) 
-0.0178*** 
(-60.7034) 
-0.0175* 
(42.3994) 
-0.0110*** 
(-27.5943) 
Difference -0.0013 
(-1.1078) 
-0.0014* 
(-1.4190) 
-0.0006 
(-0.2969) 
0.0133*** 
(7.5220) 
0.0172*** 
(6.9517) 
0.0156*** 
(2.9353) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses and brackets are t-statistics. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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3.6 Conclusion  
 
Using the event study methodology, in this chapter we examined the market reaction of SRI funds 
relative to conventional funds in the Japanese market amid the recent global financial crisis. We chose the 
bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers as the momentous event, for it is known to have triggered a further 
drop in stock prices and economic losses during the recession. Empirical results with the Fama–French 
three-factor model showed that the event significantly increased SRI funds at the 5% level, while the 
significant negative impact on conventional funds was estimated and a difference between two groups of 
funds was statistically significant at the 1% level. We also found that the resilience of SRI funds amid the 
event was largely due to international funds, a possibility given that investors might evaluate the CSR 
activities of international firms more than those of domestic firms. Alternatively, we can assume that the 
universe of domestic SRI funds is too limited to enjoy risk diversification. Altogether, we confirmed that 
SRI funds better resisted the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers than conventional funds. This result 
could be useful information to help the diffusion of SRI since stability is the most important investment 
factor for individual investors in Japan (Japan Securities Dealers Association, 2014). 
Our approach can be extended to investigate the impact of financial crisis in other countries and in 
other time periods. Comparison of the impact of the financial crisis on SRI funds with other events, using 
data from other countries as well would provide useful information. Fund data in the United States market 
could be analysed with the same methodology, since the financial crisis was triggered by defaults on 
subprime loans in the US. Such studies might lead to some interesting comparison of the level of impact 
on SRI funds in Japan with SRI funds elsewhere in the world. 
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Chapter 4 
An Experimental Study on Motivations for Socially 
Responsible Investment  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The market size of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) amounts to 17.9 per cent and 58.8 
percent in the US and Europe, respectively, enough to have a potentially considerable impact on the 
whole financial market (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, 2015). 10 Despite the importance of SRI, 
what motivates people to invest in socially responsible companies has yet to be identified. While many 
studies have compared the performances of SRI funds and conventional funds, they have found no 
significant difference between them discussed in Chapter 1. This means that solely economic gain cannot 
explain why people invest in SRI funds. 
 Several studies on investment flow found that SRI investors do not follow economically 
rational behaviour, and choose assets that do not maximise return on investment given a certain risk. 
Bollen (2007), for example, examined the relationship between fund flows and returns, using data on US 
mutual funds for the period 1980 through 2002. He found that even though lagged returns were negative, 
SRI investors did not sell as many funds as conventional investors rationally did. Benson and Humphrey 
(2008) provided a further insight into SRI investor behaviour by incorporating both monthly and annual 
returns to see if investors react to current and/or past information, and by incorporating lagged flow to 
take into account the persistence of fund flow, using data from January 1991 to September 2005. They  
found that SRI fund flows were less sensitive to returns than conventional funds, and SRI investors were 
more likely to invest in a fund they already own. In line with the previous studies, Renneboog et al. 
                                            
This study is supported by The Mitsui & Co., Ltd., Environment Fund. We would like to acknowledge the valuable 
comments and suggestions of Dr. Takahiro Tsuge at Konan University, Dr. Shinpei Sano at Chiba University, and 
participants at the Ishikawa-Takeuchi Seminar and Matsubayashi Seminar at Kobe University. The authors also thank 
participants at the seminar on the Role of Financial Industry toward a Sustainable Society and those at the seminar on 
Environmental Information, both of which were held in March 2013 at Kogakuin University, for their helpful 
comments. 
 
10 There are some notable differences between the SRI market in Western countries and that in Japan, where we 
conducted our economic experiments. First, the total net assets of SRI trusts in Japan amount to less than 1 per cent 
of all investment trusts. Second, the main participants in SRI in the US and Europe are institutional investors 
(especially pension funds), whereas those in Japan are individual investors. (See “2011 Review of Socially 
Responsible Investment in Japan” issued by Social Investment Forum Japan in 2012 for more details). For these 
reasons it is more suitable to focus on individual investors when exploring motivations for SRI in Japan conducted 
our economic experiments.  
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(2011), by using fund data from around the world, confirmed that SRI investors seemed to be more 
inelastic regarding returns than conventional investors. 
While findings of these studies suggest that the behaviour of SRI investors is different from 
that of rational investors as defined by classical economics, how different is still unclear. SRI investors do 
not seem to make random decisions regarding investment; rather, they seem to have a certain investment 
decision-making process that evaluates both financial and non-financial factors. Recent developments in 
behavioural finance suggest that psychological aspects might play a critical role in investor behaviour 
(Pompian, 2012). Focusing on these psychological aspects of investors would help towards understanding 
the behaviour of the SRI investor. 
This chapter aims to uncover the motivations behind SRI and how they differ from those in 
other types of investment by using laboratory experiments. We asked subjects to make decisions on stock 
investments with regard to three attributes: return, variance, and CSR (corporate social responsibility), so 
that we could estimate their utility function. We also conducted a dictator game and lottery-choice 
experiments to measure subjects’ heterogeneity in regard to three psychological factors: altruism, risk 
aversion, and time preference. We used the psychological factors to apply a conditional logit model so as 
to examine the following hypotheses about the decision-making process of SRI investors. Hypothesis 1: 
Investors who are more altruistic are more likely to be SRI investors. Hypothesis 2: Investors who are 
more risk averse are more likely to be SRI investors. Hypothesis 3: Investors who have a lower time 
discount rate are more likely to be SRI investors. The main findings of this chapter accept the first 
hypothesis, that people who are more altruistic are more likely to be SRI investors, but not the second and 
third hypotheses. With regard to our third hypothesis, the estimation results show that people who have a 
higher time discount rate also incline to be SRI investors.  
We also examined whether an availability to choose CSR activity influences investment 
decisions. When subjects are allowed to choose the project for a firm’s CSR activity, they obtain 
significantly higher utility from the CSR attribute. This suggests that reflecting investors' preferences in 
CSR activities would lead to a higher evaluation of CSR efforts. Taken together, the results of this study 
offer a helpful insight into the characteristics of potential SRI investor and how their demand can be 
stimulated. 
 The contribution of this study is twofold. First, we employ a behavioural economic approach 
and use psychological factors to investigate motivations for SRI. We focus on altruism, risk aversion, and 
time preference as internal factors leading to investment in socially responsible companies. Second, we 
use methodologies that have been developed in studies in the field of experimental economics to measure 
the extent of altruism, risk aversion, and time preference. Methodologies that have been used in such 
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studies are theoretically rigorous, thereby providing a more consistent estimate of the characteristics of 
investors.	  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews relevant literature and 
explains our hypotheses. Section 4.3 presents our methodology, including our data, experimental design, 
and theoretical framework. The empirical results follow in Section 4.4. The effect of choosing destination 
of donation on SRI is discussed in Section 4.5. We then summarise our findings in Section 4.6. 
 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
4.2.1 Demographics and Psychology 
 
There are many papers that analyse why some people invest in SRI and others do not (Rosen 
et al., 1991; Tippet and Leung, 2001; Junkus and Berry, 2010; McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Williams, 
2007; Owen and Qian, 2008). The majority of existing studies focus on comparing the demographic 
attributes of SRI and conventional investors. Some of these studies conclude that demographic 
information can explain the difference between these two types of investors. Rosen et al. (1991) 
conducted a mail survey of 1,493 individual SRI investors in the United States and compared their 
demographic characteristics with those of conventional investors. Their findings were that SRI investors 
were younger and better educated but had less income than general mutual fund investors. Similar results 
were obtained from a survey conducted by Tippet and Leung (2001) of Australian investors, including 99 
ethical investors. In addition, they found that SRI investors in Australia were less likely to be retired 
investors, tended to be part-time workers, own fewer stocks, and invest less money than conventional 
investors. Junkus and Berry (2010) conducted a large survey that had 5,391 responses from individual 
investors in the United States. Their findings are also in line with the earlier studies just mentioned above, 
with the added information that single people were more likely to be SRI investors. On the other hand, 
McLachlan and Gardner (2004) found, using a sample of Australian investors, that there were no 
statistically significant differences between 54 SRI investors and 55 conventional investors in such 
demographic attributes as age, education, and income. Williams (2007) obtained similar results; using a 
wide survey of investors across five countries, he confirmed that demographics did little to distinguish 
SRI investors from conventional investors. Although earlier studies suggest that demographic 
characteristics can explain the difference between SRI investors and conventional investors, the results of 
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more recent studies no longer support such a conclusion.11 
In contrast to studies that focus on demographic variables, some studies have tried to explain 
the characteristics of SRI investors from a psychological point of view. McLachlan and Gardner (2004) 
concluded that differences between SRI and conventional investors were caused by cognitive, personality, 
and environmental factors. They found that SRI investors rated ethical issues as being more important in 
their investment decisions than conventional investors did. Although the statistical significance was 
marginal, it was shown that SRI investors were more altruistic than conventional ones. Owen and Qian 
(2008) surveyed 1,808 respondents from the United States and found that investors with higher 
environmental concerns for their shopping were more likely to be SRI investors. Acting on these findings, 
we focus on psychological factors to explain why some investors choose SRI and others do not.  
 
4.2.2 Altruism, Risk Aversion, and Time Preference 
 
 Andersen et al. (2008) characterised utility functions in three dimensions, reflecting preferences 
over goods, time, and uncertainty. Following this line of discussion, we hypothesise that three psychological 
factors might play a significant role in decision making in regard to SRI: altruism, risk aversion, and time 
preference. 
 
Altruism 
 
The first hypothesis is intuitive and straightforward. Since the aim of CSR activities is to take 
responsibility towards society as a whole, this fact is expected to have a positive impact on members of the 
local and global community. Whether this attitude attracts potential investors depends on the extent to 
which the investors care about the well-being of society as a whole. Therefore, investors with higher 
altruism would have a higher tendency to be SRI investors.  
 As far as we know, no study has compared the degree of altruism of SRI investors and 
conventional investors. However, Rosen et al. (1991) showed that SRI investors could be a group of 
people who are altruistic. They conducted a mail survey of 1,493 individual SRI investors in the United 
States and found that more than 80 per cent of their sample belonged to or donated money to charitable 
causes. Even though they did not compare the percentages of similar people among non-SRI investors, 
                                            
11 Financial literacy might be another reason why there are seemingly irrational investment. Borgers and Pownall 
(2014) used stated preference survey and compared attitudes of Dutch household members in 2011 towards socially 
responsible investment practice. They found that over one third reported at least one financial choice inconsistent 
with rational behavior. 
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the results suggested that SRI investors were altruistic. Nilsson (2009) examined the difference in degree 
of altruism among SRI investors by a survey of 563 individual SRI investors in Sweden. He found that 
respondents who have higher proportions of SRI funds in their financial assets are more altruistic than 
those who have fewer SRI funds. Although these studies did not establish whether or not SRI investors 
are more altruistic than conventional counterparts, they confirmed that altruism is associated in some way 
with being an SRI investor. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investors who are more altruistic are more likely to obtain higher utility from the attribute of 
Corporate Social Responsibility; in other words, more altruistic people tend to be SRI investors since they 
would expect CSR activities to contribute more to society. 
 
Risk aversion 
 
 According to the modern portfolio theory, investors attempt to minimise risk for a given level 
of expected return (Markowitz, 1952). In other words, lower risk is one of the important factors in 
determining investment. Researchers have discussed whether or not implementing CSR activities could 
reduce management risk, which leads to a lower risk of stock values plunging (Heal, 2005). Hamilton 
(1995), for example, examined how an announcement of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency impacted on the stock values of TRI firms, using event study 
methodology. Detailed result was already discussed in Chapter 1, The results in short showed that 
investor reactions to the news of the environmental pollution caused by those firms was significantly 
negative; on the day the TRI data was released, there was a drop in stock prices, and an average loss in 
stock value of $4.1 million. Flammer (2012) also showed that environmentally unfriendly actions by 
firms led to negative impacts on the stocks of such firms, and the negative reaction by shareholder was 
increasing over time. These findings show that firms’ socially irresponsible behaviour is assessed 
negatively in the financial market. Therefore, there is a possibility that investors might avoid investing in 
such firms, or be likely to invest in socially or environmentally responsible firms because they are less 
risky investments. Indeed, Findings of Chapter 3 show that funds holding stocks of firms actively 
engaged in CSR suffered less than conventional funds from the global financial crisis (Nakai et al., 2011). 
In other words, SRI funds were less risky than conventional funds. Rosen et al. (1991) also showed that 
SRI investors were somewhat risk averse in terms of Likert-scaled statement when asked if they are 
willing to take investment risks in the hope of bigger gains (though they carried out no comparison with 
conventional investors). Prompted by these findings, we hypothesise that SRI investors appreciate CSR 
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activities because they contribute to making their investment less risky. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Investors who are more risk averse are more likely to obtain higher utility from the 
attribute of CSR; in other words, people with higher risk aversion tend to be SRI investors since they 
would expect CSR activities to bring lower risk to their stocks. 
 
Time Discount Rate 
 
 Another advantage of CSR is that such activities by a firm sets its goods or services apart 
from those of other firms, and this might contribute to better profits in the future. While companies are 
required to make significant investments in the short run when pursuing CSR, they could gain financial 
return in the long run through improved corporate governance and competitiveness. Thus one of the 
potential benefits of investing in a company with a higher CSR orientation can be such a return over a 
longer period of time if the investors have enough patience to wait until the gain is realised. 
 Cox et al. (2004) investigated the pattern of institutional investors in the UK and how it 
related with CSR activities by companies, using a sample of over 500 UK companies. They found that the 
proportion of a company owned by long-term investors (e.g., pension funds, life insurance funds, and 
charitable funds) was significantly and positively related to company social performance. Benson and 
Humphrey (2008) showed that SRI fund investors were prone to invest longer than conventional fund 
investors. Winnett and Lewis (2000) examined popular models of financial markets in financial 
journalism and concluded that much of the discussion suggests that ethical financial decisions were 
linked to long-term prospects rather than to irresponsible short-term prospects. If SRI investors appreciate 
the advantage of long-term investment, it can be concluded that they have a lower time discount rate.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Investors who have a lower time discount rate are more likely to obtain higher utility from 
the attribute of CSR, since they would expect CSR activities to lead to greater corporate profit in the long 
run. 
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4.3 Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Data and Experimental Design 
 
 We conducted laboratory experiments on 22 December 2012 and 16 January 2013 at Kyoto 
Sangyo University, Japan. We had 50 participants in total, but of these we used for our estimation were 
46 people due to incomplete answers. Those who participated in our experiments were undergraduate 
students at Kyoto Sangyo University who were recruited through a website. In both sessions, male 
subjects and economics students were dominant, as shown in Table 4.1. Participants were allowed to 
attend only one session. The experiments were carried out through a paper-based system on 22 December, 
and through a computer-based system on 16 January; what the subjects were asked to do was much the 
same on each date except for the donation settings (discussed in more detail in Section 4.5). In the 
computer-based system we used SurveyMonkey to have our subjects answer the questions and to collect 
their answers immediately.12 Once subjects accepted the terms of the experiment and signed their consent 
forms, the experimenters explained to them the schedule and the rewards the subjects were going to 
receive at the end of the entire experiment (See the Appendix 4A). Each subject received 1,000 Japanese 
yen (equivalent to US$9.81 as of 17 April 2014) as a show-up bonus and an additional amount of money 
that was dependent on their performance in the experiment. Each session included four experiments, the 
first of which was a choice experiment to elicit subjects’ preferences regarding the return, risk, and CSR 
attributes of stock investment (Experiment A). The other three were a dictator game and two 
lottery-choice experiments to estimate subjects’ psychological characteristics, which are Experiment B, 
Experiment C, Experiment D, respectively. We set a preparatory exercise for the choice experiments to 
ensure that subjects fully understood what to do and how to answer. The experimenters had randomly 
selected in advance two experiments out of four to determine participants’ rewards; the subjects, however, 
did not know which two had been selected until all experiments were completed. Each session took 
approximately an hour and a half.  
The choice experiment aims at investigating people’s preference over a set of alternatives 
expressed as a bundle of attributes, called a choice set (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974; McFadden, 1974); 
an example is shown in Table 4.2. Each attribute has levels (presented in Table 4.3), so this makes a 
profile different over alternatives. Subjects faced three alternatives and were asked to choose the one they 
preferred the most. Through seeing their choices, we note how changes in the attribute levels affect their 
                                            
12 SurveyMonkey is the world’s most popular online survey tool; it enables its users to send free surveys, polls, 
questionnaires, customer feedback, and market research. (https://www.surveymonkey.com) 
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choices, thus enabling us to estimate their utility functions. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
  December Session  
(n = 25) 
 January Session 
(n = 21) 
  Number of Subjects Percentage  Number of Subjects Percentage 
Gender Male 20 80  14 67 
 Female 5 20  7 33 
Total  25 100  21 100 
       
School Economics 12 48  4 19 
 Others 13 52  17 81 
Total  25 100  21 100 
 
 
Table 4.2: An Example of a Choice Set in the Choice Experiment 
 Stock A Stock B 
I invest in neither 
Stock A nor  
Stock B. 
 
Possible Return on 
Investment 
 
0 points 
20 points 
-10 points 
0 points 
20 points 
30 points 
 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
 
10 points  0 points 
 
Choose one and tick box	 	 	 □	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 □	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 □ 
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Each respondent was asked to invest 100 points in one of the first two options (Stock A, 
Stock B); or, if they choose the third option (“I invest in neither Stock A nor Stock B”), they would be 
saving 100 points. They were to make such a choice 12 times. In our study, we calculated the rewards 
such that one point was equivalent to one Japanese yen. The amount of money that subjects earned or lost 
by investment in each choice could not carry over to the next choice. 
We have three attributes: Possible Return on Investment, Variance, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Possible return on investment is the measure of the profit earned from each investment, 
and it has four patterns as shown in Table 4.4. Its expected return is highest in Pattern A and lowest in 
Pattern D. Variance is a measure of risk, in that it looks at which return will be forthcoming with how 
much likelihood. Although it was not shown explicitly as an attribute in a choice set (see Table 4.2), an 
experimenter explained to the subjects the event possibility for each possible return as follows. If there 
are two possible returns appearing in a choice set (see Stock A in Table 4.2), each of the two appears with 
a 50 per cent chance, which we regard as low risk. On the other hand, four possible returns shown in a 
choice set (Stock B in Table 4.2) means a high risk, since each of the four returns appears with a 25 per 
cent chance.13 The Corporate Social Responsibility attribute shows the amount of money that a firm 
donated to a non-governmental organisation. We specified the non-governmental organisations in this 
experiment to be WWF Japan, UNESCO Japan, and Plan Japan. A higher amount of donation by a 
company can be interpreted as a greater effort directed toward environmental or social issues. With the 
settings such that the experimenters actually paid those amounts of donations to those organisations, 
subjects obtained utility from investing in such firms. The point we should note here is that even though a 
subject chooses to invest in a firm with a donation, his or her possible return is not reduced by the amount 
of donation. This reduces cognitive burden of respondents, since they do not have to calculate the net 
possible return of each choice. It also reflects the reality: investment return is not usually deducted even 
though people invest in firms implementing CSR activities (See Appendix 4B-A for the instruction of 
Experiment A). 
We used all combinations of the attribute levels (4 * 2 * 3 = 24 combinations) as a profile and 
two of them were randomly selected, which became a choice set by adding the third option, which is “I 
                                            
13 We calculated variance in a general manner as follows: 
. 
Variance of a choice with two possible returns is 100, and variance of one with four possible returns is 250. Therefore, 
we regard the former as low risk and the latter as high risk. If someone chooses “I invest in neither Stock A nor Stock 
B”, he/she knows that he/she is going to save 100 points, which can be considered as no risk. 
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invest in neither Stock A nor Stock B”.  
 
Table 4.3: Attributes, Their Definitions, and Levels 
Attribute Definition Level 
Possible Return on Investment The measure of the profit earned 
from each investment 
 
4 patterns (see Table 5.4) 
Variance  The variance of possible return 
on investment 
None = 0 
Low = 100 
High = 250 
Corporate Social Responsibility The amount of money that a firm 
donated to WWF Japan, 
UNESCO Japan, or Plan Japan 
(return for a subject is NOT 
lowered due to a contribution) 
 
0 points 
1 points 
10 points 
 
Table 4.4: Possible Return on Investment 
Pattern Possible Return on Investment 
A 10 points 20 points 40 points 50 points 
B 0 points 10 points 30 points 40 points 
C -10 points 0 points 20 points 30 points 
D -20 points -10 points 10 points 20 points 
 
 
4.3.2 Conditional Logit Model 
 
The theoretical framework of a conditional logit model is as follows. We assume that 
respondent  has a random utility function for choosing alternative  as shown in eq. (4.1). The 
indirect utility consists of the observable utility  and the stochastic component of utility that is 
identically independently distributed, and follows a type-I	 extreme value distribution.  
 
                                  .	 	                              (4.1) 
 
The probability of alternative  chosen out of alternatives in choice set  can be 
n i
Vni εni
Uni =Vni +εni
i C = {1,2,..., J}
 50 
shown as follows: 
                         
Pni (Uni >Unj,∀i ≠ j) =
exp(µVni )
exp(µVnj )
j∈C
∑ ,                 (4.2)
 
 
where µ  is a scale parameter. We assume a linear model for as in eq. (4.3). The observable utility 
consists of Return, Variance, and CSR as well as interaction terms of CSR*Altruism, CSR*Risk Aversion, 
CSR*Time Discount, CSR*Economics Students, CSR*Female. To test hypotheses, we need to look at 
estimation results of interaction terms. If β4  is positive and statistically significant, it can be interpreted 
that people with higher utility from CSR tend to obtain higher utility from altruism. Since we regard 
people obtaining a positive utility from CSR as SRI investors, this result supports the first hypothesis. We 
can interpret β5  to β8  the same way except that β6 must be significantly negative to support our 
hypothesis.  
 
         
Vni = β0 +β1Return+β2Variance+β3CSR+β4CSR*Altruism+
β5CSR*Risk Aversion+β6CSR*Time Discount+
β7CSR*Economics Student+β8CSR*Female.
     (4.3) 
 
We used altruism, risk aversion, and time discount rate to examine the motivations for SRI. 
We followed Forsythe et al. (1994) to measure altruism by asking subjects to answer how much out of 
500 Japanese yen they would give their partners (see further details in Appendix 4B-B). They did not 
know who their partners were, even after the experiment. We used the amount of money they gave their 
partners as the measure of their altruism: the more money they gave, the more altruistic they were. To 
measure their attitude toward risk, we presented subjects with ten paired lottery-choice decisions (shown 
in Table 4.5) and asked them to choose Lottery A or Lottery B in each of the ten options (Holt and Laury, 
2002; see further details in Appendix 4B-C). In both Lottery A and Lottery B, greater rewards were 
possible in the later options. Lottery A was defined as a safe choice, so people with more Lottery A 
choices can be considered to be more risk averse. See Table 4.6 to better understand the relationship 
between the number of safe choices and the classification of risk preference. We announced to the 
subjects that after the lottery-choice experiment we were going to randomly choose a number to decide 
which numbered option was going to be used to determine their rewards, and then choose another number 
to determine how much the prize would be; by doing this, we gave subjects an incentive to choose all 
options carefully. 
Vni
 51 
Table 4.5: Ten Paid Lottery-Choice Decisions 
Option Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
1 1/10 of 200 yen, 9/10 of 160 yen 1/10 of 385 yen, 9/10 of 10 yen  
2 2/10 of 200 yen, 8/10 of 160 yen 2/10 of 385 yen, 8/10 of 10 yen  
3 3/10 of 200 yen, 7/10 of 160 yen 3/10 of 385 yen, 7/10 of 10 yen  
4 4/10 of 200 yen, 6/10 of 160 yen 4/10 of 385 yen, 6/10 of 10 yen  
5 5/10 of 200 yen, 5/10 of 160 yen 5/10 of 385 yen, 5/10 of 10 yen  
6 6/10 of 200 yen, 4/10 of 160 yen 6/10 of 385 yen, 4/10 of 10 yen  
7 7/10 of 200 yen, 3/10 of 160 yen 7/10 of 385 yen, 3/10 of 10 yen  
8 8/10 of 200 yen, 2/10 of 160 yen 8/10 of 385 yen, 2/10 of 10 yen  
9 9/10 of 200 yen, 1/10 of 160 yen 9/10 of 385 yen, 1/10 of 10 yen  
10 10/10 of 200 yen, 0/10 of 160 yen 10/10 of 385 yen, 0/10 of 10 yen  
 
Table 4.6: Risk Aversion Classifications Based on Lottery Choices 
Number of 
Safe 
Choices 
Range of Relative Risk 
Aversion for 
 
Risk Preference 
Classification 
0-1  Highly Risk Loving 
2  Very Risk Loving 
3  Risk Loving 
4  Risk Neutral 
5  Slightly Risk Averse 
6  Risk Averse 
7  Very Risk Averse 
8  Highly Risk Averse 
9-10  Stay in Bed 
 
We conducted another lottery experiment suggested by Coller and Williams (1999) to measure the time 
preference of subjects (See Appendix 4B-D). Subjects were given the opportunity to obtain either 5,000 
yen in one month or somewhat more in three months. They needed to choose which payment they 
preferred in each of a total of 15 options (Table 4.7). The amount given in three months varied but would 
always be greater than 5,000 yen. Again we told subjects that a random number would be chosen to 
U x( ) = x1− r 1− r( )
r < −0.95
−0.95 < r < −0.49
−0.49 < r < −0.15
−0.15 < r < 0.15
0.15 < r < 0.41
0.41 < r < 0.68
0.68 < r < 0.97
0.97 < r < 1.37
1.37 < r
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decide which option would determine their rewards, and another number would be randomly chosen to 
determine who the winner was. This setting follows Coller and Williams (1999). Table 4.8 shows the 
relationship between the option at which subjects switch from payment option A to payment option B and 
their rate of time preference. The less money that people are willing to give up by obtaining payment in 
one month, the lower the time preference they have. 
 
Table 4.7: Fifteen Payment-Option-Choice Decisions 
Option 
Payment Option A 
(pays amount below in 
one month) 
Payment Option B 
(pays amount below in 
three months) 
Your Choice 
1 5,000 yen 5,016 yen  
2 5,000 yen 5,025 yen  
3 5,000 yen 5,033 yen  
4 5,000 yen 5,041 yen  
5 5,000 yen 5,062 yen  
6 5,000 yen 5,082 yen  
7 5,000 yen 5,103 yen  
8 5,000 yen 5,125 yen  
9 5,000 yen 5,144 yen  
10 5,000 yen 5,164 yen  
11  5,000 yen 5,205 yen  
12  5,000 yen 5,288 yen  
13  5,000 yen 5,411 yen  
14 5,000 yen 5,616 yen  
15 5,000 yen 5,822 yen  
 
We were concerned about possible significant correlations between variables in the 
psychological variables we used. Anderhub et al. (2001) showed a significant negative relationship 
between risk aversion and time preference. We therefore examined correlations among the three variables. 
The correlation coefficients between altruism and risk aversion, altruism and time preference, and risk 
aversion and time preference turned out to be -7.1 per cent, -28.0 per cent, and 7.1 per cent, respectively. 
Hence we concluded that no serious multicollinearity exists in our estimation. 
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Table 4.8: Time Preference Classification based on the Experiment 
Option Where Switch Occurs Rate of Time Preference (Annual Interest Rate) 
1 2.0% 
2 3.0% 
3 4.0% 
4 5.0% 
5 7.5% 
6 10.0% 
7 12.5% 
8 15.0% 
9 17.5% 
10 20.0% 
11 25.0% 
12 35.0% 
13 50.0% 
14 75.0% 
15 100.0% 
 
 
4.4 Estimation Results  
 
 Table 4.9 shows the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum for 
psychological variables: Altruism, Risk Aversion, and Time Discount Rate. As is mostly observed in 
earlier studies, more than half of the subjects gave their peer more than zero yen in a dictator game. In our 
experiment, about 40 per cent of subjects gave their peers nothing, another 40 per cent of them paid less 
than 150 yen to their peers. With regard to risk aversion, our subjects on average were very risk averse. 
Estimated risk aversion is 0.71 on average, which is slightly lower than those found in earlier studies 
(Andersen et al., 2006; Andersen et al., 2008). Mean discount rate is 0.51 with standard deviation of 0.41. 
We found that participants on average exhibit a higher time discount rate. However, it is distributed on 
the two sides, which means that there is a split in our subjects between those who have a lower and higher 
time discount rate. 
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Table 4.9: Distribution of Psychological Variables  
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Altruism 46 66.17 89.93 0 250 
Risk Aversion 46 0.71 0.43 -0.32 1.37 
Time Discount 
Rate  
46 0.51 0.41 0.02 1.00 
 
The estimation results by conditional logit model are given in Table 4.10. Firstly, it can be 
seen that subjects significantly obtain positive utility from Return and negative utility from Variance as 
expected from the modern portfolio theory, even though we obtain statistical significance only for Return. 
The coefficient of CSR shows up as negative value, but statistical significance is not found. As regards 
the estimation results of interaction terms, we obtain statistical significance for coefficients of 
CSR*Altruism and CSR*Time Discount, which are positive values. As regards other interaction terms, we 
obtain positive coefficients for CSR*Risk Aversion and CSR*Economics Student, while that of 
CSR*Female is negative, but they are not statistically significant. 
 We now turn to test our three hypotheses. As we obtain a positive and significant result for 
CSR*Altruism, we take as confirmed our first hypothesis, which is “Investors who are more altruistic are 
more likely to be SRI investors”. As for the second hypothesis, “Investors who are more risk averse are 
more likely to be SRI investors”, the results show that SRI investors are indeed more risk averse, but the 
second hypothesis is not supported as the results are not statistically significant. Regarding the third 
hypothesis, that “Investors who have a lower time discount rate are more likely to be SRI investors”, we 
obtain a result that shows, contrary to our expectation, that investors who have a higher time discount rate 
tend to be SRI investors. From these results, we reach a conclusion that motivations for SRI could include 
as follows. First, the result of first hypothesis shows that the motivation could be a desire to contribute to 
the society. Second, findings from the third hypothesis reveal that SRI investors are not patient unlike our 
expectation, instead they would be interested in urgent issues in the real world that could include 
immediate gain or engaging in something they need to deal with in the shorter period of time. In fact, the 
most selected donation project in our experiment were “The UNESCO Association Scholarship for 3.11 
Disaster-Stricken Children and Students” in the UNESCO Japan and one of the priority projects in Plan 
Japan “Improvement accesses to safe drinking water and basic sanitation in Cambodia”, which are 
obviously the project that especially needs the immediate actions for.  
 
 55 
Table 4.10: Estimation Results from Conditional Logit Model 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. 
Return .2215*** .0145 
Variance  -.0006 .0009 
CSR 
CSR*Altruism 
CSR*Risk Aversion 
CSR*Time Discount 
CSR*Economics Student 
CSR*Female 
 
-.0408 
.0007*** 
.0047 
.1251** 
.0033 
-.0112 
 
.0503 
.0003 
.0426 
.0493 
.0431 
.0431 
 
Log Likelihood 
AIC 
No. of Observations 
-221.09737 
458.2 
552 
 
 
 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
 We also included gender and student dummy variables to control for those effects on choice 
of investment. The estimation results show that they do not significantly affect investment decisions. 
While some studies (Frank et al., 1993; Simmons and Emanuele, 2007) revealed that females are more 
altruistic than males, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Cox and Deck (2006), and Rigdon and Levine 
(2011) asserted that females are not always more altruistic than males. Depending on the cost of altruistic 
behaviour, gender difference in such behaviour disappears or even reverses. Also, there are studies that 
conclude that females are less generous than males. Bauman and Rose (2009) is such an example. Other 
studies (Frank et al., 1993; Haucap and Muller, 2014;14 Bauman and Rose, 2009) hold that economics 
students are less generous than other students on the grounds that economics students are intrinsically 
more self-interested than non-economics students, and this tendency is strengthened through taking 
economics courses. For this reason we need to control for subjects’ attributes in order to clarify the effect 
of altruism on decision making for SRI. 
 
 
                                            
14 When the authors control for gender and progress of study in their trust game, the economics student dummy does 
not itself show statistical significance. In their estimation results, female economics students are less trustworthy, and 
their trust level falls even lower over the course of their economics studies relative to their counterparts. 
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4.5 Option to Choose a Project 
 
 In our experiment, when subjects decided to invest some money in a stock involving CSR, the 
experimenters actually made that amount of donation to one of the environmental or social projects 
carried out by WWF, UNESCO, or Plan. We assumed that a higher amount of points meant greater 
efforts for CSR by that firm. We chose to donate to those three particular organisations because this 
enabled subjects to choose from a variety of social activities. WWF is especially known for their 
environmental activities, UNESCO has engaged in activities for further development and promotion of 
culture, and Plan has been involved in social activities aimed at encouraging children’s rights and 
extending children's potential. Plan has also recently been active in programmes to help girls in 
developing countries receive a proper education so that they can obtain stable employment. These 
organisations engage in different kinds of social issues. 
 To investigate whether the possibility of choosing the destination of a donation affects the 
investor utility, we designed different donation settings in our experiment. In the first session conducted 
on 22 December 2012, subjects were able to choose which project in which organisation their donation 
would go to if they invested in stocks containing donations. We provided them with a list of projects in an 
appendix attached to their instructions. When the experiment on investment choice was over, subjects 
were asked to indicate on the sheet, with a check mark, their choice of one project to which they would 
like their donations to be made. In the January session, however, we did not allow subjects to choose a 
project, although they knew that their donations would go to one of the three organisations. In order to 
examine whether the different setting for donations led to greater or lower utility from CSR, we used the 
following equation: 
 
Vni = β0 + β1Return+β2Variance+β3CSR+β4 (CSR*Choice),
where Choice = 1 if the respondent have a option to choose a project
where Choice = 0 otherwise
      	  （4.4） 
 
We pooled all data from the December and January sessions and estimated with a conditional logit model. 
There is an interaction dummy variable shown as CSR*Choice equal to one if subjects participated in the 
December session, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of CSR shows the utility obtained directly from 
CSR, since CSR*Choice controls possible distinctions caused by the difference in option to choose the 
destination. 
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Table 4.11: Estimation Results with Dummy Variable Distinguishing  
between the December Session and the January Session 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. 
Return .218*** .014 
Variance -.000 .001 
CSR 
CSR*Choice 
 
Log Likelihood 
AIC 
No. of Observations 
.010 
.076** 
 
-224.90476 
457.8 
552 
.026 
.035 
 
 
 
 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
The coefficient of CSR*Choice tells us whether the design allowing subjects to choose their donation 
destination changes their utility; since CSR*Choice has a positive coefficient with statistical significance, 
the design that enables people to choose the donation projects actually increases their utility, as we see in 
Table 4.11. This suggests that reflecting investors' preferences in CSR activities would lead to a higher 
evaluation of CSR efforts. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of Chapter 4 was to reveal the decision-making process in SRI, by using economic 
experiments. We conducted an investment experiment with undergraduate students to estimate their 
utility function and also conducted three experiments to measure three psychological factors: altruism, 
risk aversion, and time preference. We used these psychological factors to apply a conditional logit model, 
and examined whether these factors affect motivations for investing in the stock of companies that are 
actively promoting CSR. 
The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, we found that people who 
are more altruistic are more likely to be SRI investors. Secondly, people who are more risk averse tend to 
be SRI investors, but that effect is not statistically significant. Thirdly, people who have a higher time 
discount rate significantly incline to be SRI investors. From these findings, we conclude that motivations 
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for SRI could include a desire to contribute to society and an interest in urgent issues in the real world. 
The reason why the result for the third hypothesis is opposite to our expectation can presumably be that 
investors with a higher discount rate are interested in firms actively engaging in social issues that need to 
be solved urgently. Furthermore, when subjects were allowed to choose the project for their donation, 
they obtained significantly higher utility from the CSR attribute. This suggests that reflecting investors' 
preferences in CSR activities would lead to a higher evaluation of CSR efforts. 
 We can point out some limitations of our study and important tasks for further research. First 
of all, our experiments were conducted with undergraduate students who might have less experience in 
investment activities. Their decision making might not reflect the reality of active investors, while we 
think that our result is helpful in understanding the behavior of potential investors. Second, the number of 
subjects for our experiments may have been insufficient to have robust estimation results. Third, we tried 
to identify fundamental psychological mechanisms behind SRI investment; while we believe that this 
attempt partially succeeded, statistical support for our psychological variables is not strong, and this could 
stem from the second issue we just mentioned. Further investigation of these points remains to be done. 
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Chapter 5 
Does Social Pressure Stimulate Socially Responsible 
Investment?: An Experimental Approach  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is expected to attract an inflow of money into 
corporations engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. If investors demand the stocks 
of firms engaging in CSR activities, a win-win situation between investors and such firms would arise 
since more CSR activities would be implemented and the firms’ stock price would be higher. CSR 
activities could also increase social welfare through such activities as improving the quality of the 
environment. The market size of SRI in developed countries is growing, now accounting for around 10 
per cent out of the whole financial market in the United States (US SIF, 2012). While the SRI market in 
Japan is still extremely small (less than 1 per cent of all investment trusts), there is a large number of 
potential investors who could join the market.  
 A large number of studies have tried to identify who is more likely to invest in SRI, which 
could be helpful information for the development of the SRI market. Some studies have focused on the 
demographic information of investors as a determinant of SRI investment (Rosen et al., 1991; Tippet and 
Leung, 2001; Junkus and Berry, 2010; McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Williams, 2007). Using a mail 
survey for SRI investors in the United States, Rosen et al. (1991) found that SRI investors were more 
likely to be younger, better educated, and have less income than conventional investors. Tippet and Leung 
(2001) conducted a survey on Australian investors and they obtained similar results to Rosen et al. (1991) 
with the additional finding that SRI investors are more likely to be part-time workers, own fewer stocks, 
and invest less money than conventional investors. Junkus and Berry (2010) carried out a large of survey 
more than 5,000 individual investors in the United States, and their results were also in line with the 
earlier studies. However, several studies have argued that demographic information cannot distinguish  
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like to acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions of Dr. Kenta Tanaka at Musashi University. An earlier 
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Policy Study in September 2014. Helpful comments from the session participants are also acknowledged. The authors 
also thank our subjects and the assistants of the laboratory experiment for their participation and support. 
 
 60 
between SRI investors and conventional investors. For example, there were no significant differences 
between Australian SRI investors and conventional investors in terms of such attributes as age, education, 
and income (McLachlan and Gardner, 2004). These results were confirmed by Williams (2007) in a 
survey of investors across five countries. The results of these studies suggest that investors’ demographic 
information cannot always explain who tends to be an SRI investor. 
A growing body of literature has focused on investor’s psychological features to determine 
the characteristics of SRI investors (Rosen et al., 1991; McLachlan and Gardner, 2004; Vyvyan et al., 
2007; Nilsson, 2009; Barreda-Tarrazona et al., 2011; Nakai et al., 2013). McLachlan and Gardner (2004) 
argued that cognitive, personality, and environmental factors make people either conventional investors 
or SRI investors. The main findings of their study were that SRI investors put great value on ethical 
issues in their investment decisions and were more altruistic than their counterparts, although the 
statistical significance was marginal. Rosen et al. (1991) found that SRI investors could be a group of 
altruistic people. Nilsson (2009) also conducted a survey of Swedish individual investors to evaluate the 
altruism of SRI investors. He found that SRI investors who held a higher proportion of SRI funds in their 
total assets were more likely to be altruistic than those who held less. Vyvyan et al. (2007) found that all 
types of investors eventually regarded performance as the most important criterion for their investment 
decision even though environmentalists placed a higher premium on the environmental performance of 
their investment. Nakai et al. (2013) estimated subjects’ utility functions from data obtained in a 
laboratory experiment on SRI investment and found that SRI investors tended to be more altruistic and 
had higher time preferences than conventional investors.  
While the results of above-mentioned studies suggests that SRI investors are more altruistic, 
targeting such a small proportion of investors would not be the most efficient way to expand the scale of 
the SRI market. Therefore, it might be better to use instruments that induce people to behave more 
altruistically. According to the results for the public goods game in the previous literature, such altruistic 
behaviour can be promoted via social pressure. Here, social pressure involves a variety of influences and 
interactions between subjects, such as communication between subjects (Isaac and Walker, 1988a; Bochet 
et al., 2006; Kumakawa, 2013), punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Bochet et al., 2006; Balliet and 
Lange, 2013), , and smaller group size (Isaac and Walker, 1988b; Isaac et al., 1994; Andreoni, 2007). The 
disclosure of identification is one type of social pressure that can be implemented with a relatively low 
cost.  
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) examined whether the disclosure of information on the 
investment decisions or the identification via photographs of subjects affected the result of the public 
goods game. They compared the baseline and three treatments: Photo, Information, and the combination 
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of the two (Information-and-Photo). In the Information treatment, subjects knew the contributions of the 
other group members but could not identify who they were. The disclosure of information led to greater 
cooperation on average, perhaps because revealing other traders’ investment decisions gave a standard of 
contribution among the group to the members. Thus, people follow group norms to avoid being regarded 
as non-cooperators or to obtain the approval of other members. On the other hand, the Photo treatment 
allowed participants to identify other members but not the amounts of their contributions. Identifying 
contributors can be an effective way of enabling them to fell prestige; however, the Photo treatment itself 
would not be very effective since participants would not have information on individual contributions. 
The Information-and-Photo treatment was therefore expected to give prestige to the greatest contributors. 
The experimental results indicated that a disclosure of both information and photos resulted in 59 per cent 
more investment in public goods relative to the baseline, while neither the Information treatment nor the 
Photo treatment had a significant impact on contribution. 
Rege and Telle (2004) also conducted a public goods game and found that the indirect social 
approval induced by the treatment in which each participant revealed his or her choice to all subjects 
significantly increased cooperation in giving. Samak and Sheremeta (2013) extended the study of 
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) with additional treatments in which the highest contributors were recognised 
(Top-Free), the lowest contributors were recognised (Bottom-Free), and all were recognised, but with 
costs (All-Costly). When a participant was recognised, his or her photo, first name, and contribution 
amount were disclosed. Samak and Sheremeta found that identifying all contributions without any costs 
(All-Free) significantly increased contributions relative to no disclosure (None-Free), which was in line 
with the results of Andreoni and Petrie (2004). The contribution under All-Costly was significantly larger 
than Non-Free and was as effective as All-Free. While Top-Free was not significantly different from 
None-Free, subjects raised their level of cooperation considerably in Bottom-Free. Furthermore, 
Bottom-Free was surprisingly as effective as All-Free. Thus, the risk of identification was fully effective. 
The results also suggest that shame is more effective than prestige. 
The effectiveness of the disclosure of identity has also been confirmed in field experiments. 
For example, Soetevent (2005) examined the effect of removing anonymity for the amounts of donations 
in 30 Dutch churches. When open-collection baskets were used for the offering, the level of contributions 
increased, although only for the second offering with external causes. Alpizar et al. (2008) investigated 
whether asking subjects to make a donation decision in front of the solicitor or to give a gift before asking 
for donations affected the amounts of donations for a national park in Costa Rica. Although contributions 
made in public were not significantly higher in the regression analysis results, a combination of the two 
treatments increases the level of cooperations with statistical significance. 
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 These studies found that the exposure of identity and information on decision-making 
significantly increases the level of cooperation in the public goods game. The aim of this chapter is to 
experimentally examine whether this also applies in the context of the financial market. In this chapter, 
prosocial behaviour in the financial market is defined as investing in the stock of a firm engaging in CSR 
activities (hereafter, “CSR stock”). We compare the demand, transaction volume, and transaction price 
for CSR stock between a Control session and a Treatment session in which a subject’s photo and 
investing information is visible to other group members. Our main findings can be summarised as follows. 
First, traders ordered significantly more CSR stocks in the Treatment session than in the Control session. 
Second, the trading volume of CSR stocks in the Treatment session was significantly higher than in the 
Control session. Third, disclosure of CSR stockholding information did not have a significant effect on 
trading prices. These results suggest that when people feel social pressure from the disclosure of 
stockholding information and their photo, they demand CSR stock more. SRI might be stimulated by 
social pressure even if there is not a greater financial return relative to the conventional stock.  
 The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 explains our hypothesis and the 
estimation models. Our experimental design and subjects are discussed in Section 5.3. The results of the 
experiment and econometric analysis follow in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 briefly summarises our main 
findings. 
 
 
5.2 Hypotheses 
 
 Earlier studies mentioned in the Introduction (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Samak and 
Sheremeta; 2013) showed that the disclosure of such identification as a participant’s photo, name, and 
information regarding his or her decision-making induced significantly more altruistic behaviour in public 
goods experiments. We examine whether this identification plays a role in the context of the financial 
market where people might behave more egoistically. We focus on the effect of identification on the 
demand for CSR stock, transaction volume, and trading price. The present study employs the 
“Information-and-Photo” treatment as an identification strategy (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). To create 
social pressure in the laboratory, in our study, “information” is equivalent to the disclosure of information 
on traders’ CSR stock holdings and “Photo” is the disclosure of their photos. We hypothesise that under 
the social pressure, traders will desire to feel prestige and avoid being regarded as “selfish,” so that they 
will demand more CSR stock, which will lead to greater transaction volumes and a higher trading price 
for CSR stock. 
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Hypothesis 1:The disclosure of a trader’s photo, ID, and information on his or her CSR stock holdings 
increases demand for CSR stock. 
Hypothesis 2: The disclosure of a trader’s photo, ID, and information on CSR stock holdings increases 
the trading volume of CSR stock. 
Hypothesis 3: The disclosure of a trader’s photo, ID and information on CSR stock holdings increases the 
trading price of CSR stock. 
 
 
5.3 Experimental Design  
 
The computerised experiments were conducted on 4, 13, 18, and 20 February 2014 at Kobe 
University and on 8 and 9 December 2014 at the University of Tokyo. The experimental schedules at the 
universities are shown in Table 5.1. Each session included nice 9 subjects, and we had 180 subjects in 
total. These subjects had no experience in asset market experiments and were not allowed to participate in 
our experiment more than once. Half the subjects were assigned to the Control group, and the other half 
to the Treatment group. The participants were undergraduate and postgraduate students from various 
departments who were recruited through flyers posted around campus and on Twitter (only for the 
experiment at Kobe University). Table 5.2 shows the demographic information of our subjects. 
Participants were directed to an isolated individual space so that they could make their 
decisions privately. Once participants accepted the terms of the experiment and signed their consent 
forms, they were not allowed to have any communication with the others participants until the end of the 
experiment. The experimenters explained the schedule and rewards the subjects were going to be paid 
(See the Appendix 5A).15 Each session involved a 10-period market experiment in which participants 
traded stocks. Each session took approximately an hour and a half on average, including 30 minutes of 
the instruction time and five minutes for participants to study the instructions individually. At the end of 
the experiment, participants received an envelope containing information about their rewards and the 
amount of their donations in accordance with the investment decisions made during the experiment. They 
also received the URL of our website so that they could make sure the donation were actually paid to the 
organisation (discussed in more detail later in this section). The reward included 2,000 Japanese yen 
(equivalent to US$19.7 as of 8 July 2014) as a show-up bonus and an additional amount of money that 
depend on their performance in the experiment. The average earnings for the market experiments were 
                                            
15 Subjects at Kobe University were paid a month after the experiment via bank transfer, while subjects at the 
University in Tokyo were paid in cash at the end of experiment. 
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1,160 Japanese yen (equivalent to US$11.42 as of 8 July 2014).  
We set up a continuous double-auction environment following the basic experimental design 
of Smith et al. (1988) using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) in which subjects could be both buyers 
and sellers. All traders were given a cash endowment of 525 Japanese yen and two dividend-paying assets, 
a conventional stock and a CSR stock. Participants traded their assets during 10 distinct three-minute 
trading periods. In our experiment, we defined CSR stock as the stock of a firm engaging in CSR 
activities. By investing in such firms, subjects could contribute to society through donations to 
organisations engaging in social activities such as environmental conservation, educational support in 
developing countries, and the preservation of cultural heritage. The conventional stock and the CSR stock 
differed in that holding a CSR stock entailed a donation of 10 Japanese yen to the project that traders 
preferred most from 18 options, which included WWF Japan, Plan Japan, and the National Federation of 
UNESCO Associations in Japan. After the instruction (See the Appendix 5B) was read, we allowed 
participants to reread the materials about the 18 projects and to choose which project to donate to. The 
donation accumulated over 10 periods, and the total amount of the donation at the end of 10 periods was 
the actual money donated to the project. The important consideration in the donation setting was that even 
if a trader held any CSR stocks, his or her reward was not reduced by the amount of the donation. To 
avoid any misunderstanding, we mentioned this rule twice in our instructions. Holding a conventional 
stock did not involve any donations. Other than the donation setting, there was no difference between 
conventional stock and CSR stock. Traders had opportunities to earn profits by holding stocks via 
dividends and buyouts. Dividends for a conventional and CSR stock were determined independently from 
the fixed distribution of {0, 4, 14, 30} with a 25 % chance, and the expected value of the dividend was 12. 
Thus, the starting value was 300, and the value decreased by 12 in every period. Traders could sell any 
stocks for 180 per stock at the end of Period 10. Thus, the total amount of reward from the experiment is 
the sum of the dividends, buyouts, and remaining cash.  
 Traders had 15 seconds to check their individual investment results (which was private 
information) and the market summary (which was public information) at the end of every period. In 
addition, in the Treatment session, each trader’s photo, ID, and CSR stock holdings were shown as public 
information (Figure 5.1) to create social pressure within the laboratory. The photos were taken before the 
instruction was read. See the Appendix 5B for the full information of our experimental setting as well as 
the Appendix 5C for supporting information to our subjects. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Subjects 
Control Group  Treatment Group 
Date Number of Subjects  Date Number of Subjects 
Experiments at Kobe University 
4 February, 2014 (AM) 9  18 February, 2014 (AM) 9 
4 February, 2014 (PM1) 9  18 February, 2014 (PM1) 9 
4 February, 2014 (PM2) 9  18 February, 2014 (PM2) 9 
13 February, 2014 (AM) 9  20 February, 2014 (AM) 9 
13 February, 2014 (PM1) 9  20 February, 2014 (PM1) 9 
13 February, 2014 (PM2) 9  20 February, 2014 (PM2) 9 
Experiments at the University of Tokyo 
8 December, 2014 (AM) 
Room A 
9  9 December, 2014 (AM) 
Room A 
9 
8 December, 2014 (AM) 
Room B 
9  9 December, 2014 (AM) 
Room B 
9 
8 December, 2014 (PM) 
Room A 
9  9 December, 2014 (PM) 
Room A 
9 
8 December, 2014 (PM) 
Room B 
9  9 December, 2014 (PM) 
Room B 
9 
Total 90  Total 90 
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Table 5.2: Summary of Experimental Sessions 
  Control Group  
(n = 90 ) 
 Treatment Group 
(n = 90) 
  Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage  Number of Subjects Percentage 
Experiments at Kobe University 
Gender Male 41 76  39 72 
 Female 13 24  15 28 
Total  54 100  54 100 
       
School Economics 25   20  
 Engineering 6   3  
 Others 23   31  
Total  54 100  54 100 
Experiments at the University of Tokyo 
Gender Male 24 67  34 94 
 Female 12 33  2 6 
Total  36 100  36 100 
       
School Economics 4 11  6 17 
 Engineering 18 50  24 67 
 Others 14 39  6 17 
Total  36 100  36 100 
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Figure 5.1: 
An Example of the Information Stage in the Treatment Session 
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5.4 Experimental Results 
 
5.4.1 Nonparametric Analysis 
 
Buy Order 
 
 This section examines three hypotheses using nonparametric analysis. First, we analyse 
whether the disclosure of traders’ photos, ID, and information on CSR stock holdings affects the average 
number of buy orders for CSR stock. Figure 5.2 compares the average number of buy orders for CSR 
stock in the Control and Treatment sessions. Buy orders for CSR stock in the Treatment session were 
almost always larger than those in the Control session with exception of the later period. We can confirm 
this by the Wilcoxon singed-rank test shown in Table 5.3. From the nonparametric test, we can conclude 
that social pressure significantly increased the demand for CSR stock at the 5 % level. See the Table 5D-1 
in the Appendix 5D to know the number of buy orders of CSR stock by session and university. 
 
Figure 5.2:  
Comparison of the Average Number of Buy Orders for CSR Stock by Market 
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Table 5.3: Average Buy Orders for CSR Stock 
 Market 
 Control Treatment Difference 
Period    
1 6.2083  7.3750  -1.1667  
2 7.1250  7.2083  -0.0833  
3 5.5833  6.7083  -1.1250  
4 4.4167  6.1667  -1.7500  
5 5.5000  7.0000  -1.5000  
6 4.6250  6.6250  -2.0000  
7 5.2083  5.2500  -0.0417  
8 4.2500  4.5833  -0.3333  
9 4.7917  3.8333  0.9583  
10 5.1667  5.1667  0.0000  
Minimum 4.2500  3.8333  -2.0000  
Maximum 7.1250  7.3750  0.9583  
Median 5.1875  6.3958  -0.7292  
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
Z-Statistics   
 
-2.245** 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Trading Volume 
 
 Figure 5.3 compares the average trading volume of CSR stock between the Control and 
Treatment sessions. Under our second hypothesis, more CSR stock would be traded under the disclosure 
of subjects’ photo, ID, and information on CSR stock holdings. Figure 5.3 shows that CSR stocks are 
traded more in Treatment sessions in five of the 10 periods. However, the difference is not statistically 
significant, as shown by the Wilcoxon singed-rank Z-statistics in Table 5.4. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis: there is no significant difference in trading volume between the Control and Treatment 
sessions. See the Table 5D-2 in the Appendix 5D to recognise the number of trading volumes of CSR 
stock by session and university. 
 
Figure 5.3: 
Comparison of the Average Trading Volumes of CSR Stock by Market 
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Table 5.4: 
 Average Number of Trading Volume of CSR Stock by Markets Over All Periods 
 Market 
 Control Treatment Difference 
Period    
1 3.4583  3.5000  -0.0417  
2 2.8333  3.2917  -0.4583  
3 1.5833  2.6667  -1.0833  
4 0.9583  1.7083  -0.7500  
5 2.0417  2.3750  -0.3333  
6 1.8333  1.8333  0.0000  
7 2.1667  1.6250  0.5417  
8 1.5417  1.2500  0.2917  
9 1.5833  1.2500  0.3333  
10 2.0417  2.0417  0.0000  
Minimum 0.9583  1.2500  -1.0833  
Maximum 3.4583  3.5000  0.5417  
Median 1.9375  1.9375  -0.0208  
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
Z-Statistics   
 
-0.923 
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Trading Price 
 
 The third hypothesis is that CSR stock would be traded at a higher price under social pressure 
if our first and second hypotheses are correct. Figure 5.4 shows the comparison of the average price of 
CSR stock between the Control session and Treatment sessions. Unlike Figures 5.2 and 5.3, we cannot 
see a clear difference in the average price between the two markets except in the later period. We also 
calculated the bubble measures with five methods, as shown in Table 5.5 (Stöckl et al., 2010; King, 1991; 
Haruvy and Noussair, 2006). Four bubble measures (Relative Deviation, Price Amplitude, Total 
Dispersion, and Average Bias) show that CSR stock was valued more highly in the Control session than 
that in the Treatment session, as indicated in Table 5.6. These differences are statistically significant for 
Relative Deviation and Price Amplitude, but the Wilcoxon singed-rank test shows that the other three 
measures are not statistically different between the Control and Treatment sessions. Refer the Table 5D-3 
and Table 5D-4 in the Appendix 5D to see the average price of CSR stock by session in Kobe University 
and University of Tokyo, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.4:  
Comparison of the Average Price of CSR Stock by Market 
 
 73 
Table 5.5: Bubble Measures and Formulae 
Measure Formulae 
Relative Absolute Deviation a RAD = 1N Pp −FVp FVp=1
N
∑  
Relative Deviation a RD = 1N Pp −FVp( ) FVp=1
N
∑  
Price Amplitude b PA =  max Pp −FVp( ) FV1"# $%−min Pp −FVp FV1( )"# $%  
Total Dispersion c TD = Median Pp −FVpp=1
N
∑  
Average Bias c AB= 1N Median Pp −FVp( )p=1
N
∑  
Notes: Pp = mean price in period p; FVp = fundamental value in period p; FV = mean fundamental value in the 
market; Median Pp = median price in period p; N =total number of periods 
a Stöckl et al. (2010) 
b King (1991) 
c Haruvy and Noussair (2006) 
 
Table 5.6: Bubble Measure Results 
 Control Treatment Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
Z-Statistics 
Relative Absolute Deviation 0.0390 0.0836 -1.376 
Relative Deviation 0.0226 -0.0079 1.886* 
Price Amplitude 0.4320 0.3430 1.886* 
Total Dispersion 267 226.5 1.143 
Average Bias -57 -11.5 -0.987 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
5.4.2 Econometric Analysis 
 
We now turn to hypothesis testing via econometric analysis. Regarding the first hypothesis, 
the nonparametric analysis concluded that the disclosure of identification and investment information led 
to greater demand for CSR stock. The estimation results shown in Table 5.7 support the result that the 
coefficient of d _ treatment  ( β1 ) is significantly positive at the 1 % level. Hence, we conclude that 
traders ordered significantly more CSR stocks under the disclosure of traders’ photos and information on 
CSR stock than in the Control session. The coefficients of Period , the interaction term of 
d _ treatment * period and the price of the sell order ( β2  and β3 respectively) are significantly 
negative, which is in line with expectations. Although Bidprice  is positive that is not as expected, it is 
not statistically significant. 
 
Findings 1: The disclosure of traders’ photo, IDs and information on CSR stock holdings significantly 
increases demand for CSR stock 
 
With respect to the second hypothesis, the results of the regression analysis shown in Table 
5.7 reveal that the coefficient of d _ treatment  ( β1 ) is significantly positive at the 5 % level. 
Although the results of the nonparametric and regression analyses are mixed, we can conclude that 
revealing participants’ identities and investment information led to more trading of CSR stocks than in 
the Control session. We obtain the expected signs for the coefficients of Period  ( ), the interaction 
term of d _ treatment * period  ( ), and trading price  ( ). 
 
Findings 2: The disclosure of traders’ photo, ID, and information on CSR stock holdings significantly 
increases the trading volume of CSR stock 
 
 In regard to the third hypothesis, the estimation result in Table 5.7 supports the results of the 
nonparametric analysis: the disclosure of traders’ photo and information regarding their CSR stock 
holdings do not have significant effects on trading prices. Although the coefficient of d _ treatment  
(β1 ) is positive, as expected, it is not statistically significant. Intuitively, this result does not make sense 
since we have already determined that social pressure significantly increases the demand for and 
transaction volume of CSR stock. To determine why the trading price of CSR stock is only marginally 
higher, we analysed the effect on sell orders with the following estimation equation: 
 
β2
β3 β4
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The Number  of  Sell  Order  = β0 +β1  d _ treatment +β2  period +β3  d _ treatment * period +β4  ask  price+ε  
 
where the independent variable is the number of sell orders for CSR stock, d _ treatment  is a  
dummy variable of the Treatment session, period  is a continuous variable representing the trading 
period, d _ treatment * period is an interaction term, and ask  price  is the average price of the buy 
orders. The coefficient of d _ treatment  ( β1 ) is positive but not statistically significant. If the supply 
of CSR stock is significantly affected by the identification, the price would remain constant even though 
demand increased. On the one hand, supposing that the supply of CSR stock is constant, its price must be 
significantly higher than in the Control session. Thus, we conclude that the results of marginal increase in 
the stock price of CSR stock would be caused by a marginal increase in its supply in the Treatment 
session.  
 
Findings 3: The disclosure of traders’ photo, ID, and information on CSR stock holdings do not have a 
significant effect on the trading price of CSR stock 
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Table 5.7: Estimation Result with Regression Analysis 
 Buy Order 
(1) 
Trading Volume 
(2) 
Trading Price 
(3) 
Sell Order 
(4) 
Treatment Dummy 
 
2.8656*** 
(0.7741) 
 
1.2022** 
(0.4132) 
5.2344 
(7.8156) 
 
0.8140 
(0.6404) 
Period 
 
-0.1359* 
(0.0790) 
 
-0.0602 
(0.0428) 
-2.8210*** 
(0.9743) 
 
0.0725 
(0.0745) 
Treatment Dummy * 
Period 
 
Bid Price 
 
 
Trading Price 
 
 
Trading Volume 
 
 
Ask Price 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
No. of Observatios 
Adjusted 𝑅! 
-0.3487*** 
(0.1248) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8291*** 
(0.5380) 
 
200 
0.1400 
-0.1094 
(0.0666) 
 
 
 
 
0.00697*** 
(0.0010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.6899* 
(0.3747) 
 
200 
0.2695 
-1.3238 
(1.3420) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4.4112*** 
(1.3431) 
 
 
 
 
275.971*** 
(7.5174) 
 
417 
0.0522 
-0.0940 
(0.1032) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0084** 
(0.0042) 
 
6.0872*** 
(1.1178) 
 
200 
0.0145 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All numbers are rounded off to three decimal places. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5 aimed to experimentally examine the effect of social pressure exerted through the 
disclosure of each trader’s photo, ID, and investment information on demand for CSR stock through the 
laboratory experiment. Subjects traded two types of divided-paying stocks, conventional stock and CSR 
stock, in a double-auction setting. The only difference between the two stocks was that the experimenter 
donated money to a non-governmental organisation according to trader’s number of CSR stock holdings. 
We conducted Control and Treatment sessions; each trader’s identification and information on CSR stock 
holdings were public knowledge in the Treatment session. 
The main findings of this chapter can be summerised as follows. Firstly, the disclosure of 
each trader’s photo, ID, and information on CSR stock holdings significantly increased demand for CSR 
stock. Secondly, the transaction volume of CSR stock increased significantly under this social pressure. 
Thirdly, the trading price was not significantly affected by the exposure of identification and investment 
information. From these results, we conclude that social pressure matters even in the context of the 
financial market. Under the situation in which each trader’s identification and investment decision was 
made known to the group, demand for CSR stock increased. This could be because people are likely to 
feel prestige or social approval by buying CSR stocks or to wish to avoid being regarded as “selfish” 
because they held no CSR stock; thus, they would demand more CSR stock, which would result in 
increased CSR stock trading volume.  
There are several issues that our study does not address. First, we adopted the disclosure of 
subjects’ photos, ID, and investment as a means of social pressure. However, if we employed other 
channels to exert social pressure, such as face-to-face communication, the results could change. Thus, 
future research should examine whether other types of social pressure also create greater demand for CSR 
stock. Second, our experimental design cannot identify which of psychological factors caused by social 
pressure induces active investment in CSR stocks. Our study has shown that social pressure matters in the 
stock market, and examining this issue should be the next step. Third, the extent to which social pressure 
is effective may vary among cultures or countries. Thus, experiments in other nations or cultures could 
bring in different conclusions. We leave these issues for further investigation. 
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks  
 
 This thesis has attempted to understand investor evaluations towards CSR activities in the 
Japanese market, identify the psychological features of SRI investors, and explore the effectiveness of 
social pressure on greater demands to SRI. These findings provide an academic contribution to 
understanding the financial evaluation of CSR and SRI investors behaviour in Japan and the social 
contributions of stakeholders and policymakers who aim to enhance SRI in Japan. 
 Chapter 2 investigated how investors judged a firm’s membership in a sustainability index, 
namely the Morningstar-SRI Index in Japan. For the period 2003 to 2010, we estimated the impact of 
inclusion in and removal from the index on the share prices of relevant company stocks. The estimation 
results showed that the inclusion in the SRI index was evaluated positively by Japanese market, while 
exclusion from the index did not show any statistically significance. Our results also demonstrate that the 
average cumulative abnormal returns were negative in the first two years, but later became positive. This 
could be due to the investors’ growing appreciation of corporate social responsibility during the research 
period.  
 Chapter 3 used an event study to compare SRI funds and conventional funds in the Japanese 
market with respect to the impact of the global financial crisis. Taking the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers as the particular event, the average cumulative abnormal returns of both SRI funds and 
conventional funds were estimated with Fama-French Three-factor model accounting for firm size and 
book-to-market effect, and the results showed that SRI funds were more resistant to this event.  
 Chapter 4 identified motivations for SRI through laboratory economic experiments. We asked 
subjects to make decisions regarding stock investments on the basis of the three attributes of return, 
variance, and CSR, after which we estimated their utility function. We also conducted a dictator game 
and lottery choice experiments to measure subjects’ heterogeneity with regard to three psychological 
factors: altruism, risk aversion, and time discount rate. We used psychological factors to apply a 
conditional logit model, and then examined whether these factors affect investment in the stock of 
companies that actively promote CSR. The main findings of this study were that: more altruistic people 
are more likely to be SRI investors, the effect of risk aversion on SRI was statistically insignificant, and 
people who demonstrated a higher time discount rate were more significantly inclined to be SRI 
investors. 
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 In Chapter 5, we used a laboratory experiment to investigate whether the social pressure, 
disclosure of a subject’s photo and investment information, affected the subject’s investment decision 
regarding the stock of a firm engaging in CSR activities. We asked subjects to trade two types of dividend 
paying stocks, conventional stock and CSR stock, in a double-auction setting. In a Treatment session, the 
subject’s ID, photo, and information regarding CSR stock holdings were displayed as a public 
information at the end of every round of trading. Our main findings can be summarised as follows. First, 
subjects significantly ordered more CSR stocks in the Treatment session than in the Control session. 
Second, the trading volume of CSR stocks in the Treatment session was significantly higher than in the 
Control session. Third, disclosure of CSR stock holding information did not have a significant effect on 
trading prices. These results suggest that when people feel social pressure through the disclosure of stock 
holding information and their photo, they show an increased demand for CSR stock. SRI was stimulated 
by social pressure even when there is not a greater financial return relative to the conventional stock.  
From the estimation results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we know that firms promoting CSR 
activities are positively evaluated in the short-term basis. Along with the result of Nakajima (2011), who 
showed that the Japanese market evaluated socially responsible firms more positively than their 
counterpart from 2001 to 2010, we can conclude that investors in Japan comprehensively appreciate CSR 
activities and regard them as a positive factor to their investments both in the short- and long-term. 
Chapter 4 reveals that altruistic people are more likely to be SRI investors. Additionally, we found an 
availability to choose CSR activity would lead to a higher evaluation of CSR efforts. Chapter 5 
discovered how to attract people to invest in SRI in the way that does not focus on limited potential 
investors like the altruistic people we identified in Chapter 4, but on the general public. The results 
obtained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 can be effectively published, so that investors in Japan can recognise 
how CSR has been judged in the financial market so far, which can provide valuable information and 
knowledge. The results in Chapter 3 could especially help the diffusion of SRI since stability is the most 
important investment factor for individual investors in Japan (Japan Securities Dealers Association, 2014). 
The results of Chapter 4 could provide useful information for the government and investment firms to 
more effectively attract potential SRI investors. Chapter 4 also suggests that reflecting the preference of 
consumer and investors would result in a higher evaluation of firms’ CSR efforts. The findings of Chapter 
5 indicates that the SRI market in Japan could become a system in which SRI investors can feel prestige 
in a way that is similar to fundraising efforts (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). These factors can be studied 
further to determine whether other types of social pressure might work as well. Thus, the findings of this 
thesis represent valuable information that can help stakeholders encourage the growth of the SRI market 
and eventually establish a more sustainable society.  
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
 
Appendix 3A 
The List of SRI Funds Used for the Analysis 
Fund 
ID 
Name of fund Stock companies Established 
day 
1 Nikko Eco Fund Nikko Asset Management 20th Aug 1999 
2 Nenkin Tsumitate Eco Fund Nikko Asset Management 31st Oct 2001 
3 Sompo Japan Green Open Sompo Japan 30th Sep 1999 
4 Eco Partners Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and 
Banking 
28th Jan 2000 
5 Asahi Life SRI Shakai Kouken Fund Asahi Asset Life Management 
Co., Ltd. 
28th Sep 2000 
6 Sumishin SRI Japan Open The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
26th Dec 2003 
7 Sumishin DC Good Company The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
27th Feb 2004 
8 Fukoku SRI Fund Shinkin Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
27th Feb 2004 
9 Daiwa SRI Fund Daiwa Asset Management 20th May 2004 
10 DC Daiwa SRI Fund Daiwa Asset Management 20th July 2004 
11 Mitsubishi UFJ SRI Fund Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and 
Banking 
3rd Dec 2004 
12 SAIKYO Nihon Kabushiki CSR Fund PineBridge Investments Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
18th Mar 2005 
13 Risona Japan CSR Fund PineBridge Investments Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
18th Mar 2005 
14 Sompo Japan SRI Open Sompo Japan 25th Mar 2005 
15 PainBridge Hirogin Nihon Kabushiki 
CSR Fund 
PineBridge Investments Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
28th Apr 2005 
16 Nihon SRI Open Okasan Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
12th Aug 2005 
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17 Daiwa Eco Fund Daiwa Asset Management 9th Mar 2006 
18 Sumishin Nihon Kabushiki SRI Fund The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
12th Jun 2006 
19 Amundi Risona Woman J Fund Amundi Asset Management 
Japan 
30th May 2006 
20 Chuo Mitsui Shakaiteki Sekinin Fund Chuo Mitsui Asset Management 
Co., Ltd. 
30th Nov 2006 
21 Shinkin SRI Fund Shinkin Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
8th Dec 2006 
22 STAM SRI Japan Open (Only for 
SMA) 
The Sumitomo Trust and Banking 
Co., Ltd. 
16th Feb 2007 
23 PineBridge Nihon Kabushiki SRI Fund PineBridge Investments Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
20th Dec 2007 
24 Eco Balance Sumitomo Mitsui Asset 
Management Co., Ltd. 
31st Oct 2000 
25 Nikko Global Sustainability Fund A 
(without hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management 17th Nov 2000 
26 Nikko Global Sustainability Fund B 
(with hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management 17th Nov 2000 
27 Nenkin Tsumitate Global 
Sustainability (without hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management 25th Oct 2001 
28 Nenkin Tsumitate Global 
Sustainability (with hedge) 
Nikko Asset Management 25th Oct 2001 
29 World Water Fund A Course (with 
currency hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management 26th Mar 2004 
30 World Water Fund B Course (without 
currency hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management 26th Mar 2004 
31 Nomura Global SRI 100 Nomura Asset Management 28th May 2004 
32 Nomura Sekai SRI Index Fund (For 
defined contribution pension fund) 
Nomura Asset Management 30th July 2004 
33 Chikyu Ondanka Boushi Kanren Kabu 
Fund 
Shinko Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
30th May 2006 
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34 Nikko DWS New Resource Fund Deutsche Asset Management 20th Dec 2006 
35 Global Water Fund Nikko Asset Management 15th June 2007 
36 New Generation Sekai Kankyo United Investments Co., Ltd. 29th June 2007 
37 Chikyu Ondanka Boushi Kanren Kabu 
Fund (3-month closing type) 
Shinko Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
25th July 2005 
38 Mitsubishi UFJ Global Eco Water Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and 
Banking 
27th July 2007 
39 Nomura Aqua Toushi A Course (with 
exchange hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management 29th Aug 2007 
40 Nomura Aqua Toushi B Course 
(without exchange hedge) 
Nomura Asset Management 29th Aug 2007 
41 UBS Chikyu Ondanka Taiou Kanren 
Kabu Fund 
UBS Global Asset Management 31st Aug 2007 
42 Ondanka Taisaku Kabushiki Open Kokusai Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
31st Aug 2007 
43 Chikyu Ondanka Taisaku Kabushiki 
Open 
Kokusai Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
31st Aug 2007 
44 Chikyu Kankyo Kabu Fund Daiwa Asset Management 31st Aug 2007 
45 DWS Shinshigen Technology Fund Deutsche Asset Management 31st Aug 2007 
46 Ondanka Boushi Kankyo Kanren Kabu 
Open 
Okasan Asset Management Co., 
Ltd 
27th Sep 2007 
47 Fidelity Three Basic F Fidelity Investments Limited 29th Oct 2007 
48 Tokyo Kaijo Select Sekai Kabushiki 
Fund 
Tokio Marine Asset Management 
Co., Ltd. 
6th Dec 2007 
49 Amundi Sekai Mizukanren Kabushiki 
F 
Amundi Asset Management 
Japan 
17th Dec 2007 
50 TA Clean Energy Fund Toyota Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
20th Dec 2007 
51 Amundi Sekai Kankyoryoku 
Kabushiki Fund 
Amundi Asset Management 
Japan 
21st Dec 2007 
52 DIAM Koukakuduke Income Open 
SRI (monthly closing type) 
DIAM Co., Ltd. 22nd Dec 2005 
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53 6 Shisan Balance Fund 
(Distribution-type) 
Daiwa Asset Management 14th Mar 2006 
54 6 Shisan Balance Fund (Growth-type) Daiwa Asset Management 14th Mar 2006 
55 Shizen Kankyo Hogo Fund DIAM Co., Ltd. 26th May 2006 
56 Sekai 6Shisan Kintou Bunsan Fund 
(Monthly Distribution-type) 
Daiwa Asset Management 28th June 2006 
57 ”Shigagin” SRI 3Shisan Balance Open 
(Distribution-type in the odd months) 
Daiwa Asset Management 27th Sep 2006 
58 Amundi Womenomics Balance 
Kabushiki 30 (Monthly 
distribution-type) 
Amundi Asset Management 
Japan 
19th Jan 2007 
59 Amundi Womenomics Balance 
Kabushiki 30 (Active growth) 
Amundi Asset Management 
Japan 
19th Jan 2007 
60 Chikyu Kankyo Kabu Gaisai Balance 
Fund 
Daiwa Asset Management 31st Aug 2007 
61 Kankyo Hozen Global Balance Shinko Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. 
14th Dec 2007 
62 Amundi Risona Sekai Green Balance 
Fund 
Amundi Asset Management 
Japan 
21st Dec 2007 
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Appendix 3B 
ARCH-LM Test for SRI Funds 
Fund 
ID 
 Arch Significance 
Fund 
ID 
Arch Significance 
1 0.966067  32 15.87687 *** 
2 1.027735  33 16.22302 *** 
3 2.68646 * 34 7.315012 *** 
4 1.402577  35 3.2449 * 
5 0.010112  36 1.531446  
6 0.525505  37 16.2176 *** 
7 0.471471  38 5.985241 ** 
8 1.227087  39 3.641264 * 
9 0.116404  40 5.598984 ** 
10 0.087552  41 6.926547 *** 
11 0.00211  42 16.0997 *** 
12 1.582857  43 16.04057 *** 
13 0.948066  44 19.68416 *** 
14 0.163512  45 7.191673 *** 
15 1.650385  46 0.436857  
16 0.901857  47 6.381472 ** 
17 0.044793  48 29.76349 *** 
18 0.061683  49 33.6517 *** 
19 0.03634  50 0.752861  
20 0.040993  51 24.56617 *** 
21 1.197089  52 17.05208 *** 
22 0.695522  53 3.056855 * 
23 0.661225  54 0.630496  
24 0.082158  55 23.84215 *** 
25 25.51617 *** 56 0.096191  
26 25.48944 *** 57 9.647576 *** 
27 11.17471 *** 58 20.62302 *** 
28 12.13686 *** 59 5.670033 ** 
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29 5.405308 ** 60 20.79893 *** 
30 9.281398 *** 61 16.46026 *** 
31 15.70286 *** 62 24.95287 *** 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 4A 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this economic experiment. You are kindly requested to 
note the following important reminders: 
1. You are not permitted to use your mobile phone during the experiment. 
2. You are not to speak to any other participants in this room. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer the question. 
3. You will find a letter of consent on your desk. Please read and sign it if you accept the terms and 
conditions. If you cannot accept them, you are asked to leave the room now. 
4. You are not permitted to have anything on your desk except materials provided by the experimenters. 
5. You are not to leave the room until the experiment is over. But please raise your hand if you need a 
restroom break. 
 
Your personal data, including the results of your experiment, will be kept completely confidential and 
aggregated only for research purposes. They will not be used for any other purpose than this experiment. 
Your name will not be linked with your decisions when the results of the experiment are published. You 
will be personally informed of the amount of your earnings and paid at the end of the experiment. The 
reward consists of two parts: a 1,000-yen show-up bonus and an additional sum of money that is 
dependent on your choices during the experiments. The experimenters have randomly selected in advance 
two experiments out of the four (Experiment A, Experiment B, Experiment C, and Experiment D), as the 
basis for calculating participants’ rewards. Which two experiments were selected will not be disclosed 
until the end of all experiments. The whole session will take two hours at most. 
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Appendix 4B-A 
Instruction for Experiment A (Investment Choice) 
 
In Experiment A you are to make decisions on stock investment. As the diagram below indicates, you can 
choose between “Stock A” and “Stock B”, or, if you prefer, you can choose “I invest in neither Stock A 
nor Stock B.”  
Sample Question 
 Stock A Stock B 
I invest in neither 
Stock A nor  
Stock B. 
 
Possible Return on 
Investment 
 
-20 points with 25% 
-10 points with 25% 
+10 points with 25% 
+20 points with 25% 
±0 points with 50% 
+20 points with 50% 
 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
 
10 points  1 point 
 
Choose one and tick box      □	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 □	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 □ 
 
You will be presented with twelve such choices to make. Here we introduce “point” as a hypothetical 
currency, as you can see in the sample question. In each question, you are provided with 100 points for 
your decision making. If you choose “I invest in neither Stock A nor Stock B”, 100 points will be given 
to you for certain, but you cannot carry over those points to the next investment choice. Also, when you 
invest in either Stock A or Stock B, all 100 points will be invested (that is, you cannot invest partially in 
Stock A and the rest in Stock B). All stocks differ in terms of “Possible Return on Investment” and 
“Corporate Social Responsibility”. Everything else is identical in Stock A and Stock B. 
 
“Possible Return on Investment” is the expected return from your investment of 100 points. If two returns 
are shown, as under Stock B in the sample question, one of the two appears with a 50 per cent chance. On 
the other hand, if four possible returns are shown, as under Stock A in the sample, each return appears 
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with a 25 per cent chance.  
“Corporate Social Responsibility” shows the amount of points that the firm you would invest in donates 
to one of the following organisations: WWF Japan, UNESCO Japan, or Plan Japan. Even though you 
decide to invest in a firm with CSR activities, your investment return will not be deducted. A stock with 
zero points for CSR indicates that the firm does not implement any CSR activities, and so does not donate 
to any of the above three organisations.  
 
Once we make sure that all participants have finished making all twelve choices, the actual investment 
returns are decided on the basis of random selection using a bingo cage containing balls. Your profits 
from Experiment A will be translated into real rewards using a translation rate of 1 point = 1 yen. If you 
choose any stocks involving one point or more for the attribute “Corporate Social Responsibility”, the 
firm you invested in would donate that sum of money. In this experiment, however, instead of the firm it 
will be the experimenters who will make donations in accordance with your investment after translating 
points into real money using a translation rate of 1 point = 1 yen. You can decide which 
organisation/project the donation will go to. Please choose ONE of the projects listed in the appendix to 
these instructions. If you are unable to select which project the donations should go to, select “Leave 
entirely up to experimenters”. You can make sure that the experimenters have indeed donated money to 
the project/organisation you choose by visiting our homepage, whose URL is enclosed in the envelope 
containing the rewards you will be given at the end of the experiment.  
 
You have a practice session for Experiment A. While you will face twelve choices in the real experiment, 
you have three investment choices in this practice exercise. If you have any questions about Experiment 
A, please raise your hand before the experiment begins. 
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Appendix 4B-B 
Instruction for Experiment B (Decision Making) 
 
You’re paired with a partner whose identity you will not know, neither during nor after the experiment. 
500 yen is provided to each of you, and you can give your partner none, some, or this entire sum. Decide 
how much of the 500 yen you will keep for yourself, and give your partner the rest.  
 
 
 
Sample Question 
 The Amount of Money 
(1) The amount of money you keep for yourself yen 
(2) The amount of money you give your partner yen 
(3) Total yen 
 
Please write down the amount of money that you would like to keep for yourself on line (1) in the table, 
and the amount of money that you will give your partner on line (2). Make sure the sums add up to 500 
yen. In Experiment B, your reward will be (1) plus the amount of money that your partner gives you. If 
you have any questions about this experiment, please raise your hand now. 
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Appendix 4B-C 
Instruction for Experiment C (Lottery-Choice Decisions 1) 
 
You are required to choose either Lottery A or Lottery B in each of the ten options given. Depending on 
your choices, the amount of the reward that you are going to obtain will differ.  
 
Sample Question 
Option Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
1 1/10 of 200 yen, 9/10 of 160 yen 1/10 of 385 yen, 9/10 of 10 yen ○Lottery A 
○Lottery B 
2 2/10 of 200 yen, 8/10 of 160 yen 2/10 of 385 yen, 8/10 of 10 yen ○Lottery A 
○Lottery B 
3 3/10 of 200 yen, 7/10 of 160 yen 3/10 of 385 yen, 7/10 of 10 yen ○Lottery A 
○Lottery B 
4 4/10 of 200 yen, 6/10 of 160 yen 4/10 of 385 yen, 6/10 of 10 yen ○Lottery A 
○Lottery B 
 
Choose either Lottery A or Lottery B in options 1 to 10. Note that the reward increases in the later options 
of both Lottery A and Lottery B; that is, the later options will give you more possibilities to obtain 200 
yen in Lottery A and 385 yen in Lottery B. Once we are sure that all participants have completed making 
choices for the ten questions, an experimenter will randomly produce a number from a bingo cage to 
decide which option is going to be used for your reward, and produce a second number to determine how 
much the prize will be. Raise your hand now if you have any questions. 
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Appendix 4B-D 
Instruction for Experiment D (Lottery-Choice Decisions 2) 
 
All of you have an opportunity to obtain 5,000 yen in Experiment D. Depending on whether you are paid 
in one month (Option A) or in three months (Option B), the amount you are going to receive will differ. 
 
Sample Question 
Option Payment Option A 
(pays amount below in 
one month) 
Payment Option B 
(pays amount below in 
three months) 
 
Your Choice 
1 5,000 yen 5,016 yen  
2 5,000 yen 5,025 yen  
3 5,000 yen 5,033 yen  
4 5,000 yen 5,041 yen  
 
 Choose Option A or Option B according to your preference. You are required to make such a decision 
15 times. Please note that you will receive the Option B payment two months later than if you choose the 
Option A payment, and that the amount of payment for Option A is always smaller than the one for 
Option B. When all participants finish all 15 options, an experimenter will randomly produce a number 
from a bingo cage to decide which option is going to be used for the reward, and produce a second 
number to determine who the winner will be (in this experiment only one participant will be chosen to be 
rewarded). Each of you has the same possibility to be the winner, so select each option carefully. Also, 
the reward for Experiment D will not be given to the winner at the end of the experiment today. Rather, 
he/she will be paid in either one month or in three months, in accordance with the winner's actual choice 
in this experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. 
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Appendix for Chapter 5 
 
Appendix 5A 
Instructions for the Experiment 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this economic experiment. You are kindly requested to 
note the following important reminders: 
6. You are not permitted to use your mobile phone during the experiment. 
7. You are not to speak to any other participants in this room. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and one of the experimenters will come to your desk to answer the question. 
8. You will find a letter of consent on your desk. Please read and sign it if you accept the terms and 
conditions. If you cannot accept them, you are asked to leave the room now. 
9. You are not permitted to have anything on your desk except materials provided by the experimenters. 
10. You are not to leave the room until the experiment is over. But please raise your hand if you need a 
restroom break. 
 
Regarding your private information 
Your personal data, including the results of your experiment, will be kept completely confidential and 
used only for research purposes. They will not be used for any other purpose than this research. Your 
name will not be linked with your decisions when the results of the experiment are published.  
 
Regarding the reward 
You will be personally informed of the amount of your earnings and paid at the end of the experiment. 
The reward consists of two parts: a 2,000-yen show-up bonus and an additional money depends on your 
performance. The reward is going to be paid through bank transfer in a month. (For the session in the 
University of Tokyo, the following sentence is shown, instead: the reward is going to be paid in cash in 
the end of this experiment.)  
 
Schedule 
1. Instruction for the entire experiment 
2. (Only for Treatment Group) Photo shoot 
3. Experiment  
4. Filling-in a questionnaire and signing a receipt,  
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5. (Only for University of Tokyo) Reward given to each participant – paid by cash 
The whole session will take two hours at most. 
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Appendix 5B 
Instruction for the Experiment (Investment Choice) 
 
Overview 
In this experiment, you are allowed to invest both or either stock(s) of two hypothetical firms. 
Through investment, you may earn or lose money. You can also earn money from dividends if you hold 
any stocks. The more hypothetical points you get in the experiment, the more reward you will receive. 
This experiment involves nine subjects, including you, in the same room.  
 
Stock Trading 
There are two firms that issue the stock. The first is a firm that engages in CSR (Corporate 
Social Responsibility) activities, and the other is one that does not. The stock issued by the firm involved 
in CSR activities is called “CSR stock” in this experiment. We call the stock of firm that does not engage 
in CSR activities “Conventional stock.” CSR activities conducted by the firm are defined in this 
experiment as the activities of environmental conservation, educational support for children in the 
developing countries, and donations to non-governmental organisations, and we further assume that CSR 
activities are continuously implemented by the firm from Period 1 to Period 10. At the end of each period, 
10 points are given to those organisations for each CSR stock holding. For example, if you have a CSR 
stock at the end of Period 1, 10 points of donation are paid at that point. If you hold two CSR stocks at the 
end of Period 2, 30 points of donation are going to be paid, which consist of the 10 points awarded at the 
end of Period 1 and the 20 points awarded at the end of Period 2. Note that if you sold CSR stocks, points 
of donation given at any stage will not disappear. At the end of Period 10, the cumulative points will be 
donated to environmental conservation organiations or to the United Nations. At the end of this 
experiment, you can choose which project in which orgnisation your donation will go to. You can ensure 
that the experimenters have indeed donated the money to the project/organisation that you choose by 
visiting our homepage, the URL of which is enclosed in the envelope you will be given at the end of the 
experiment. Experimenters will make donations in accordance with your investments after translating 
points into real money using a rate of 1 point = 1 yen. CSR activities are self-motivating activities; hence, 
your reward will never be deducted if you choose any CSR stocks. If you hold conventional stock, 
however, no money will be donated to such organisations. 
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Stock Dividends and Sell-out to the Experimenter 
If you hold stock, you can obtain the money in the experiment in either of two ways. First, 
you can sell out your stocks to the experimenter at the end of Period 10. The experimenter buys both 
types of stock for 180 points per stock. In other words, you can obtain money as follows: 
 
 The number of stocks you hold at the end of Period 10 × 180 points. 
 
 Another way you can earn money is by receiving dividends. If you hold any stocks that can 
be both CSR stock and conventional stock till the end of each period, you can earn money according to 
the number of stocks you hold (the number of stocks you hold × the amount of dividend). The amount 
of dividend you receive may be realised as the one of the following; 0, 4, 14, 30. Each dividend may be 
chosen at the end of each period. After the end of Period 10, you receive the dividends, and then stocks 
can be sold out to the experimenter. The amount of dividend is independently chosen for CSR and 
conventional stocks. 
 
Reward 
 The amount of reward you’ll receive for this experiment is determined using the following 
rule: 
 
The points gained by exchange of stocks and dividend + The amount of sell-out at the end of Period 10  
+ The remaining cash at the end of Period 10. 
 
We translate points into real money using a rate of 1 point = 1 yen. 
 
A Way of Buying and Selling of Stocks 
 
You are allowed to exchange stocks using the computer in front of you. Your initial endowment of stocks 
and cash will be shown on the computer when Period 1 begins. 
 
How to Read a Trading Screen 
 Look at Figure 1 in the Appendix. This is the trading screen that you’ll see when trading 
stocks. You’ll see the current period on left side of the first row, and the time remaining on right side of 
the first row. On the second row, you’ll find the number of conventional stocks that you hold on the left 
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side, the amount of cash you hold in the middle, and the number of CSR stocks on the right side. 
Conventional stocks and CSR stocks are traded separately on the left and right sides of screen, 
respectively. The amount of cash and the number of stock holdings are changed according to your trading. 
“Bid” is shown in “Sell Order,” and “Ask” is shown in “Buy Order.” More details are discussed in the 
next section. 
 
How to Order to Sell a Stock 
 Selling an order is the procedure in which you declare a Bid for a stock that you would like to 
sell. When you would like to sell conventional stock, enter Bid in “Price of Sell Order” on the left side of 
the screen and click “OK.” Similarly, when you would like to sell CSR stock, enter Bid in “Price of Sell 
Order” on the right side of the screen and click “OK”. Look at Figure 2. The computer does not allow you 
to sell more stocks than you have. Hence, if you attempt to sell a greater number of stocks than the 
amount that you actually hold, the message “You do not have stocks to sell” will be shown. You can still 
place multiple sell orders in the cases in which the orders are fewer than or equal to the number of your 
stock holdings. Note that once you click “OK,” you cannot cancel your sell order.  
Look at Figure 1 again. There are no buy orders in the market; hence, no prices are shown in 
“Buy Order.” Once you place a sell order, Bid is shown in “Sell Order.” Your order will be shown in blue. 
In this case, imagine that you place a sell order with a Bid of 250; 250 is shown in “Sell Order” in blue. 
Bids placed by other participants are also shown in “Sell Order”, but are shown in black. If any prices are 
shown in “Buy Order,” and you place a sell order, the computer will determine whether your sell order 
and the buy order placed by other participants have been successfully traded according to the rules of the 
sell order to be traded. If the transaction is not traded, your Bid will remain in “Sell Order.” 
 
How to Order to Buy a Stock 
 A buy order is the procedure through which you declare an Ask for a stock that you would 
like to purchase. When you would like to buy conventional stock, enter Ask in “Price of Buy Order” on 
the left side of the screen and click “OK.” Similarly, when you would like to buy a CSR stock, enter Ask 
in “Price of Buy Order” on the right side of the screen and click “OK.” Look at Figure 3. The computer 
does not allow you to place a buy order for more than the amount of cash you have. Hence, if you attempt 
to enter a larger amount of money than the amount that you actually hold, the message “You do not have 
enough cash to buy” will be shown. You can still place multiple buy orders in the cases in which those 
buy orders are less than or equal to your cash holdings. Note that once you click “OK,” you cannot cancel 
your buy order.  
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Look at Figure 4. There are no sell orders in the market; hence, no prices are shown in “Sell 
Order.” Once you place a buy order, Ask is shown in “Buy Order.” Your order will be shown in blue. In 
this case, imagine that you have placed a buy order with an Ask of 250, then 250 is shown in “Buy Order” 
in blue. Asks placed by other participants are also shown in “Buy Order,” but are shown in black. If any 
prices are shown in “Sell Order,” and you place a buy order, the computer will determine whether your 
buy order and the sell order placed by other participants have been successfully traded according to the 
rules of the buy order to be traded. If the transaction is not traded, your Ask will remain in “Buy Order.” 
 
The Rule of Sell Order to be Traded 
 Under the situation in which buy orders are placed by someone, and you place a sell order(s), 
the computer immediately determines whether those orders are traded. If your Bid meets the condition 
below, your sell order will be traded: 
 
Bid ≦ The Highest Price of Buy Orders. 
 
Look at Figure 5. There are three buy orders; 100, 200, and 300 in “Buy Order.” The highest Ask out of 
three is 300, which indicates that you have an opportunity to sell your stock for 300 at a maximum. If 
your Bid is less than or equal to 300, your sell order is traded. If the condition above is not met, no 
transaction is completed, and your sell order remains in “Sell Order.” 
 
Transaction Price of Sell Order When Traded 
 When transaction is completed according to the rule mentioned above, the transaction price is 
determined as following: 
 
The Highest Price of Asks Remained in “Buy Order” 
 
There are buy orders that are not traded in “Buy Order.” There are buy orders of 100, 200, and 300 in 
Figure 5. If you enter a Bid that is less than or equal to the highest value (300), the transaction is 
completed and transaction price is 300.  
 
Caution about the Rule of Sell Order to be Traded 
 A sell order is traded with a buy order one-by-one; therefore, a sell order will never be traded 
with more than two buy orders. Look at Figure 5 again. For example, if you enter a Bid of 150, your Bid 
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is lower than buy orders of 300 as well as the one of 200. However, your sell order is automatically traded 
with a buy order of 300, which is the highest price in “Buy Order.” You must know that your sell order is 
not traded with 200. If there are multiple buy orders that are the same price, then the buy order that is 
placed first will be traded on a priority basis. 
 
Processing after Sell Order is Traded 
 Look at Figure 6. When traded, the transaction price is shown in “Traded” in the middle of 
the screen. The transaction price is 300 because your sell order of 150 is traded with a buy order of 300. 
All participants can see the transaction prices under the “Traded” heading. You can see the transaction 
prices that are traded by other participants in “Traded” as well. Additionally, your Bid is shown in “Sell 
History,” and only you can check it. Other participants cannot see your Bid in your “Sell History.” Even 
after your sell order is traded, other sell orders by other participants remain in “Sell Order.” 
 
The Rule of Buy Order to be Traded 
 Under the situation where sell orders are placed by someone else and you place a buy order(s), 
the computer immediately determines whether those orders are traded. If your Ask meets the condition 
below, your buy order will be traded: 
 
Ask ≧ The Lowest Price of Sell Orders. 
 
Look at Figure 7. There are three sell orders; 300, 200, and 100 in “Sell Order.” The lowest Bid out of 
three is 100, which indicates that you have an opportunity to buy your stock for 100 at a minimum. If 
your Ask is more than or equal to 100, your buy order is traded. If the condition above is not met, no 
transaction is completed, and your buy order remains in “Buy Order.”  
 
Transaction Price of Buy Order When Traded 
 When a transaction is completed according to the rule mentioned above, the transaction price 
is determined as follows: 
 
The Lowest Price of Bids Remained in “Sell Order” 
 
There are sell orders that are not traded in “Sell Order.” There are sell orders of 300, 200, and 100 in 
Figure 7. If you enter an Ask that is more than or equal to the lowest value (100), the transaction is 
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completed, and the transaction price is 100.  
 
Caution about the Rule of Buy Order to be Traded 
 A buy order is traded with a sell order one-by-one; therefore, a buy order is never traded with 
more than two sell orders. Look at Figure 7 again. For example, if you enter an Ask of 250, your Ask is 
higher than sell orders of 100 as well as the one of 200. However, your buy order is automatically traded 
with a sell order of 100, which is the lowest price in “Sell Order.” You must know that your buy order is 
not traded with 200. If there are multiple sell orders that are of the same price, the sell order that is placed 
first will be traded on a priority basis. 
 
Processing after Sell Order is Traded 
 Look at Figure 8. When traded, the transaction price is shown in “Traded” in the middle of 
the screen. The transaction price is 300 because your buy order of 250 is traded with a sell order of 100. 
All participants can see the transaction prices in “Traded.” You can see the transaction prices that are 
traded by other participants in “Traded.” Additionally, your Ask is shown in “Buy History,” and only you 
can check this. Other participants cannot see your Ask in your “Buy History.” Even after your buy order 
is traded, other buy orders by other participants remain in “Buy Order.” 
 
The Information Shown at the End of Each Period 
When transaction time is over, sell orders and buy orders that are not traded are deleted at the 
end of each period, which means untraded orders cannot be carried over to the next period. [Participants 
in the Treatment Session: At the end of each period, you’ll see the screen as displayed in Figure 9. On the 
left side of the screen, you will see the photo, ID, and the number of CSR stock holdings of each 
participant. This information is shared with other participants within the same room, not with those in the 
next room.] In the middle [Only for the Control Group: left side] of the screen, you will check your cash 
holdings before the divided is paid, the number of stock holdings, the amount of the dividend that you 
receive in the period, and your cash holdings after dividend is paid [Only for the Control Group, as in 
Figure 9]. Additionally, you’ll see the amount of donation according to your CSR stock holdings and the 
cumulative amount of donations so far. This information is private. On the right side of the screen, you 
will see the highest, average, and lowest transaction prices in that period as well as the amounts of 
dividend and donation, which are public information. 
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Computer Operation Method After Period 10 
You will see the screen as shown in Figure 10 after 10 periods are over. After you confirm 
your results, click “Next.” When all participants have clicked “Next,” a screen as in Figure 11 is shown 
and participants should not touch the computer anymore. Please wait silently until further directions are 
given. 
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Appendix 5C 
Appendix for the Experiment 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Conventional 
Stock 
Period Cash CSR Stock 
Remaining Time 
Price of Sell Order 
Price of Sell Order 
Price of Buy Order Price of Buy Order 
The No. of Stock Holdings 
“You do not have stocks to sell”
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Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
“You do not have enough cash to buy” 
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Figure 5 
 
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
 
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9  <Shown in Control Session> 
 
 
Figure 9  <Shown in Treatment Session> 
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Figure 10 
 
 
Figure 11 
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Appendix 5D 
Data Appendix 
 
Table 5D-1:The Number of Buy Orders of CSR Stock by Session and University 
  Kobe University University of Tokyo  
 
Control Session Treatment Session Control Session Treatment Session 
Period K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K10 K11 K12 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
1 2 2 9 7 10 4 4 5 15 4 6 8 11 6 6 4 7 3 6 15 
2 5 5 9 8 6 6 4 6 5 7 8 10 8 7 7 9 4 6 4 17 
3 4 4 7 8 8 6 7 9 10 6 9 11 4 2 6 8 3 4 3 9 
4 2 3 8 5 5 9 5 5 7 4 8 9 1 5 5 3 5 4 7 8 
5 4 4 8 6 5 9 8 8 8 3 11 10 6 4 5 5 7 5 3 9 
6 3 6 4 6 2 6 9 6 9 1 6 8 5 5 2 7 6 4 7 10 
7 2 3 7 6 4 9 3 5 8 2 8 4 5 5 8 3 5 5 3 9 
8 2 3 7 5 3 7 1 4 2 1 4 7 4 4 3 5 4 7 6 7 
9 2 6 4 11 4 2 4 2 2 1 4 3 9 2 4 4 5 5 6 4 
10 3 3 8 9 2 7 1 4 7 4 6 7 6 4 5 5 6 4 8 4 
K indicates a session held in Kobe University, while T indicates one held in the University of Tokyo.  
There were 12 sessions and 8 sessions in Kobe University and the University of Tokyo, respectively. 
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Table 5D-2:The Number of Trading Volumes of CSR Stock by Session and University 
  Kobe University University of Tokyo  
 
Control Session Treatment Session Control Session Treatment Session 
Period K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K10 K11 K12 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
1 1 2 7 3 4 2 2 2 7 3 2 5 5 4 4 2 3 2 3 6 
2 1 1 3 3 1 4 1 4 2 0 4 6 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 8 
3 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 5 3 2 6 4 0 1 4 3 1 1 2 4 
4 0 1 2 0 1 3 2 0 0 1 4 3 0 0 2 1 2 2 1 2 
5 2 1 4 2 3 2 0 1 5 0 5 4 0 2 3 2 2 1 2 4 
6 0 2 1 2 0 2 3 1 4 0 2 3 1 3 1 5 1 2 2 1 
7 1 2 2 3 2 4 2 2 6 1 2 2 2 1 4 1 1 0 1 1 
8 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 3 2 
9 2 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 0 3 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 
10 2 0 3 3 0 3 0 1 4 1 4 4 1 2 3 3 2 0 3 2 
K indicates a session held in Kobe University, while T indicates one held in the University of Tokyo.  
There were 12 sessions and 8 sessions in Kobe University and the University of Tokyo, respectively. 
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Table 5D-3:Average Trading Prices of CSR Stock by Session in Kobe University 
    Kobe University 
  Control Session Treatment Session 
Period 
Fundamental 
Value K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 K9 K10 K11 K12 
1 300  300  236  216  290  208  225  226  308  212  233  225  192  
2 288  288  299  256  270  230  220  250  298  275  0  293  191  
3 276  276  255  220  290  250  250  0  268  257  295  279  195  
4 264  0  260  245  0  300  248  249  0  0  300  289  213  
5 252  295  280  263  270  367  245  0  280  267  0  274  245  
6 240  0  271  250  276  0  250  248  290  276  0  240  257  
7 228  285  270  259  277  350  264  243  300  264  320  269  246  
8 216  220  250  250  250  300  248  0  250  260  0  0  243  
9 204  200  212  260  200  223  250  210  225  240  0  227  205  
10 192  180  0  238  193  0  188  0  195  193  200  202  194  
K indicates a session held in Kobe University and there are 12 sessions. 
We rounded off the average trading price to the nearest whole number. 
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Table 5D-4:Average Trading Prices of CSR Stock by Session in University of Tokyo 
    University of Tokyo 
  
Control Session Treatment Session 
Period 
Fundamental 
Value T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 
1 300  252  186  225  225  273  165  237  209  
2 288  301  207  293  225  270  273  268  276  
3 276  0  230  298  243  270  260  290  270  
4 264  0  0  325  245  278  276  274  268  
5 252  0  243  340  253  258  270  268  274  
6 240  250  247  350  236  245  250  245  260  
7 228  243  240  338  239  235  0  230  250  
8 216  220  243  330  208  0  215  222  240  
9 204  213  0  250  197  208  0  204  211  
10 192  192  195  202  191  194  0  191  187  
                  T indicates a session held in University of Tokyo and there are 8sessions. 
                  We rounded off the average trading price to the nearest whole number. 
 
 
 
